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TERMINATION CLAIMS IN THE WASHINGTON 
METROPOLITAN REGION 
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
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While there are numerous statutes protecting employees’ job security, 
legal gaps still exist that render employees vulnerable in many ways. This 
is especially true given the at-will nature of most employment in the United 
States. To fill these gaps, most courts—including those of Maryland, 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia— created common law tort actions 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Though the elements 
of these claims are generally similar, each jurisdiction establishes important 
limitations that employment attorneys must understand. The available 
sources of public policy vary and there are many statutory remedies primed 
to preempt related common law tort actions. The damages available under 
wrongful termination do not suffer from the same caps as some statutory 
claims, and the statutes of limitations fall in terms of years instead of days. 
Nevertheless, some plaintiffs can still strategically benefit from bringing 
actions under both the common law and state or federal statutes. 
This article outlines the history of the “wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy” tort, with a specific focus on Maryland, Virginia, and 
Washington, D.C.
1
 Following the historical background is a discussion of 
the elements of wrongful termination claims in those three jurisdictions, 
including the various potential sources of public policy.
2
 After a brief 
description of potential defenses, including preemption and available 
damages, I conclude with practical advice and tips for litigating these types 
of claims.
3
 
 
                                                          

 R. Scott Oswald is the Managing Principal at The Employment Law Group, PC in 
Washington, D.C. where they litigate wrongful termination, discrimination, 
whistleblower retaliation, and other employment-related actions on behalf of 
employees. Michael Lee Vogelsang, Jr., is a Litigation Associate at The Employment 
Law Group. 
1
 See infra Part II-III (discussing the history and origins of wrongful discharge claims 
in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia). 
2
 See infra Part IV-VI (discussing the specific elements of wrongful discharge in 
Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and the similarities and differences 
between the claims in each jurisdiction). 
3
 See infra Part VII-XII (describing litigation in wrongful discharge cases including 
defenses and damages stratified by offenses). 
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II. HISTORY OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
 
The doctrine of at-will employment first appeared as a statement in a 
legal treatise by Horace C. Wood, Master and Servant § 134.
4
   In older 
cases, courts frequently referred to the at-will doctrine as “Wood’s Rule.”   
Not long after Wood’s treatise appeared, various courts began citing the 
rule in his treatise.
5
   Thus, the rule quickly became accepted law.
6
   The 
employment at-will doctrine is still law in the majority of states in the 
country.
7
 
The preference of laissez-faire capitalism and economic expansion of the 
Industrial Revolution arguably influenced the creation of the at-will 
doctrine.
8
 The new rule also afforded American courts a means by which to 
develop their own common law rule and reject the English rule, which held 
that an employment contract for an indefinite period extended for one year 
unless there was reasonable cause for discharge.
9
  
The at-will doctrine was almost universal at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
10
 The Supreme Court even temporarily afforded it 
constitutional protection.
11
 However, the Court retreated from this position 
                                                          
4
 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT.  COVERING THE 
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 272 (1877) 
(affirming that American hirings are presumed to be at-will and indefinite unless the 
servant can prove otherwise). 
5
 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87 
(Mich. 1980) (describing Wood’s rule as one which creates a higher burden on the 
servant to prove the existence of an express contract for an agreed upon term in order to 
sustain a claim of wrongful termination). 
6
 See, e.g., McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 11 A. 176, 178-179 (Md. 1887) 
(“[Wood’s treatise] is an American authority of high repute”); East Line & R.R.R. v. 
Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex. 1888) (stating that the generally accepted rule of 
employment length, absent an unambiguous contract, is “at-will.”); Martin v. N.Y. Life 
Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (“we think the rule is correctly stated by Mr. 
Wood, and it has been adopted in a number of states.”); Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. 
Co., 43 A. 609, 610 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899) (“Wood . . . very clearly states the 
difference between the rule which obtains in this country and the one in England, and I 
can find it nowhere more intelligently and satisfactorily stated.”); Harrod v. Wineman, 
125 N.W. 812, 813 (Iowa 1910) (“in this country it is held by an overwhelming weight 
of authority that a contract of indefinite employment may be abandoned at will by 
either party without incurring any liability to the other for damages. The cases are too 
numerous to justify citation.”). 
7
 See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for 
a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1131, 1132 (1992) (arguing that all states recognize 
at-will employment as dominating the employment field, and some even refuse to 
recognize the exceptions discussed in this Article). 
8
 Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Wis. 1983). 
9
 Id.  
10
 See id. (describing the dedication of the courts to the at-will employment doctrine 
throughout the U.S.). 
11
 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (holding unconstitutional an 
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in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corporation.
12
 
After President Roosevelt’s New Deal economic programs, 
“Government regulation in the workplace increased dramatically.”13 
“Congress and state legislatures recognized the need to curtail harsh 
application of the at-will doctrine and stabilize labor relations.”14 Just as the 
United States began to understand the negative side effects and social costs 
of the Industrial Revolution, so would courts realize that the at-will 
doctrine could not operate blindly and unchecked.
15
 
Eighty-two years after Wood first introduced the at-will doctrine, courts 
began to carve out certain exceptions to the doctrine.
16
 They permitted an 
action for wrongful discharge, more commonly referred to as wrongful 
termination, when an employer’s decision to dismiss an employee 
conflicted with some fundamental public policy of the state.
17
 The courts 
held that they should not allow an employer to benefit, at the expense of an 
employee, from a violation of an important public policy.
18
 The first court 
decision to recognize the public policy exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine was Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 396.
19
 The 
court in Petermann held that an employer cannot discharge an at-will 
employee because he failed to commit perjury upon its request.
20
 Doing so 
would promote illegal conduct and inhibit the performance of justice, 
neither of which would serve the public good. Judge Fox thus held that it 
would be contrary to public policy to allow an employer to fire an 
                                                          
act passed by Congress that made it an offense for an interstate carrier to unilaterally 
discharge an employee because of his membership in a labor organization); Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding unconstitutional a Kansas state law making it 
unlawful for employers to forbid employees from becoming or remaining members of a 
labor organization). 
12
 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (stating that 
Congress acted within its sphere of constitutional authority when it enacted the 
National Labor Relations Act with the purpose of preventing employers from engaging 
in unfair labor practices.).  
13
 See Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 837.  
14
 Id. 
15
 See, e.g., Peterman v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“the right to 
discharge an employee under [an employment] contract may be limited by statute.”).  
16
 Id.  
17
 See, e.g., id. (finding that the courts could not condone the at-will termination of an 
employee by his or her employer based on the former’s refusal to commit a felonious 
act, as it would be contrary to public policy). 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. 
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employee because the latter refused to commit a criminal act.
21
 Despite this 
landmark decision, the Petermann case stood alone and ignored for many 
years.
22
 
Other state courts in the United States did not begin to affirm the public 
policy exception to the at-will doctrine until almost two decades after the 
Petermann opinion.
23
 One of the first bases for successful wrongful 
termination claims was in a workers’ compensation statute. In Frampton v. 
Central Indiana Gas Company,
24
 the court held that an employee fired for 
exercising his statutory right to file a workmen’s compensation claim was 
entitled to damages.
25
 In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,
26
 the court stressed that 
Illinois’s workers’ compensation statute was a public policy of the state and 
would only be effective if wrongfully discharged employees could maintain 
a personal action for damages.
27
 In 1978 and 1979, Pennsylvania courts 
confirmed causes of action for wrongful termination for taking time off 
work for jury duty and for refusing to take a polygraph test.
28
  
Two of the most influential wrongful termination cases came out in 
1980. That year, the California Supreme Court, in Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company,
29
 accepted the reasoning in Petermann and found that 
an employer cannot discharge an employee for refusing to participate in an 
                                                          
21
 Id. 
22
 See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (listing the state cases recognizing the public policy exception following 
Petermann). 
23
 See, e.g., id. 
24
 291 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). 
25
 See id. at 428 (proclaiming that a retaliatory discharge following a claim brought 
under the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act is not acceptable and employees 
terminated  on this basis will have a private cause of action). 
26
 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. 1979). 
27
 See id. at 359 (stating that retaliatory discharge for filing of a workers’ 
compensation claim is a great offense against Indiana’s public policy, and that 
requiring greater damages than compensation to the discharged employee may not 
suffice to discourage the retaliatory practice so that punitive damages may be necessary 
to maintain deterrence); see also Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that an employer is not free to discharge an employee for a 
reason conflicting with public policy, including sex, race, religion, and retaliation for 
participation in public social welfare programs); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 
1087, 1094-95 (Or. 1978) (holding that an employee discharged on the basis of his 
application for workers’ compensation benefits was entitled to file for common law 
remedies for wrongful discharge). 
28
 See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1978) (holding that the availability for citizens to partake in jury duty is a recognized 
and important public good, protected against at-will termination of employment and 
that the plaintiff has a right to a stated cause of action for wrongful discharge under 
Pennsylvania law); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir. 
1979) (holding that an at will employee fired for refusing to take a polygraph test was 
entitled to sue his employer for wrongful discharge under Pennsylvania law).  
29
 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). 
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illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices.
30
 With language very similar to 
that of Petermann, the court held that employers are not allowed to make 
an employee’s employment contingent on the demand that an employee 
engage in illegal conduct.
31
 Moreover, it held that if the employer attempts 
to do so and discharges the employee for refusing, the employee may bring 
a personal action for wrongful discharge against the employing company.
32
 
Also in 1980, the New Jersey Supreme Court composed its landmark 
ruling in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
33
 It found that “an 
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge 
is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”34 With this background, it 
was not long until courts in and around Washington, D.C. joined the trend 
in confirming the public policy exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine. 
 
III. ORIGINS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION ACTIONS IN MARYLAND, 
VIRGINIA, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
The first wrongful termination case in the region developed in 
Maryland.
35
 After providing an extensive overview of case law on the topic 
from around the county, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted a new 
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy in 
Adler v. American Standard Corporation (hereinafter referred to as an 
“Adler claim”).36 Though the court confirmed the ability to make a 
wrongful termination claim in the state of Maryland, it found that the 
plaintiff did not meet his burden when asserting that claim.
37
 Adler reported 
illegal practices in the management of the company but failed to make the 
case that the activities he reported were truly illegal (against public 
policy).
38
 Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy recognized that modern economic 
                                                          
30
 See id. at 1336-37 (holding that an employer may not coerce his employee to 
commit illegal acts on his behalf and threaten discharge in the process). 
31
 Id.  
32
 Id. 
33
 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).  
34
 Id. at 512. 
35
 See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981). 
36
 See id. at  471 (explaining that a judicial decision  can create a new cause of action, 
especially when the court finds that current available remedies do not suit the needs of 
the public). 
37
 See id. at 471 (describing Adler’s claim as “too vague, too conclusory, [and] too 
general” to meet the prima facie burden of demonstrating that the conduct clearly 
contradicted public policy). 
38
 Id. 
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conditions differed significantly from those that existed during the birth of 
the at-will doctrine. He considered: 
 
When terminated without notice, an employee is suddenly faced with 
an uncertain job future and the difficult prospect of meeting continuing 
economic obligations. But this circumstance, of itself, hardly warrants 
adoption of a rule that would forbid termination of at will employees 
whenever the termination appeared “wrongful” to a court or a jury. On 
the other hand, an at will employee’s interest in job security, 
particularly when continued employment is threatened not by genuine 
dissatisfaction with job performance but because the employee has 
refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to perform a 
statutorily prescribed duty, is deserving of recognition. Equally to be 
considered is that the employer has an important interest in being able 
to discharge an at will employee whenever it would be beneficial to his 
business. Finally, society as a whole has an interest in ensuring that its 
laws and important public policies are not contravened. Any 
modification of the at will rule must take into account all of these 
interests.
39
 
 
 In defense of its ability to create a new cause of action in Maryland, the 
court opined that the at-will doctrine is “subject to modification by judicial 
decision where this Court finds that it is no longer suitable to the 
circumstances of our people.”40 Changing circumstances compel courts to 
adopt new rules and create new law.
41
 The developing economic and social 
landscape of the United States required such a change in Maryland law. 
Virginia was next to recognize a cause of action for wrongful 
termination.
42
 With little fanfare, the Supreme Court of Virginia confirmed 
the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine in its 1985 
decision of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville (hereinafter referred to as a 
                                                          
39
 Id. at 41-43 (emphasis added).  
40
 Id. (citing Condore v. Prince George’s Co., 289 Md. 516 (1981); Kline v. Ansell, 
287 Md. 585 (1980)). 
41
 See, e. g., Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560380 A.2d 611, 611-12 (Md. 1977) 
(discussing the trending majority of state’s recognition of intentional emotional distress 
as a basis for tort liability and analyzing the case to determine whether Maryland would 
join those cases recognizing the tort); Deems v. Western Maryland. Ry. Co.,, 247 Md. 
95231 A.2d 514, 521 (Md. 1967) (discussing the history of finding that a man’s right to 
sue for the loss of his wife’s consortium was originally based on the belief that the 
woman was the husband’s property, and admitting that, evolving views of women’s 
rights may require a modification of this common law rule to allow women to sue as 
well. 
42
 See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985) (deciding 
to adopt the public policy exception and apply it when an employer discharged an at-
will employee who was also a shareholder for exercising his right to vote). 
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“Bowman claim”).43 In Bowman, the bank and its board of directors 
discharged employees who exercised their rights as shareholders in 
questioning the manner in which the bank obtained proxies.
44
 Ruling in 
favor of the plaintiffs, Justice A. Christian Compton applied the public 
policy exception to at-will termination, discussing a trend of state 
recognition of the need for this exception.
45
 The court qualified that the 
exception would only be narrowly applied in future at-will violation 
cases.
46
  
Interestingly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, not the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, first espoused the public policy 
exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Washington, D.C. In Ivy v. 
Army Times Publishing Company,
47
 the Court of Appeals refused to rehear 
an unpublished memorandum opinion that dismissed an employee’s 
complaint.
48
 Following Taylor v. Greenway Restaurant, Incorporated
49
 and 
Pfeffer v. Ernst,
50
 the panel held that either party could terminate an 
employment contract of indefinite duration for any reason.
51
 It refused to 
create an exception to this rule for terminations made in violation of public 
policy.  
In 1986, the District Court for the District of Columbia adopted the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in Pierce, holding that D.C. 
acknowledged the public policy exception to at-will employment 
termination.
52
 It compared the public policy exception for at-will 
employment with D.C.’s public policy exception to at-will eviction in 
landlord-tenant law, and reasoned that these causes of action should be 
treated similarly.
53
 Two years later, however, the District Court in Hall v. 
Ford
54
 found that the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ivy 
confirmed that the District of Columbia did not, in fact, recognize a cause 
                                                          
43
 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).  
44
 Id. at 799. 
45
 Id. at 800 (citing to multiple courts in other jurisdictions that have also recognized 
the public policy exception). 
46
 Id. at 801. 
47
 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).  
48
 See id. at 831 (refusing to rehear the case without any supporting reasoning in the 
court’s one paragraph opinion). 
49
 Taylor v. Greenway Rest. Inc., 173 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1961) (holding that a bartender 
hired at a weekly rate could be terminated at any time and at the will of either party). 
50
 Pfeffer v. Ernest, 82 A.2d 763 (D.C. 1951) (stating that employment contracts 
defining an employment time period are legally terminated at the will of either 
employee or employer). 
51
 Ivy, 428 A.2d at 831. 
52
 Newman v. Legal Services Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C. 1986). 
53
 Id. 
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of action for wrongful termination and disapproved the decision in 
Newman.
55
   
With the decision of Adams v. George W. Cochran & Company,
56
 the 
D.C. Court of Appeals finally recognized a cause of action for wrongful 
termination.
57
 In the Adams case, the defendant wrongfully discharged the 
plaintiff after he refused to drive a truck that did not have an inspection 
sticker on its windshield.
58
 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
59
 After 
reviewing the history of wrongful termination in other jurisdictions, 
including the landmark Petermann and Tameny decisions, the court 
determined that it should “adopt a public policy exception to the general 
rule that an at-will employee may not sue a former employer in tort for 
wrongful discharge.”60 Similar to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bowman, the Adams court warned that they would confine the application 
of the public policy exception to very narrow cases where an employee’s 
refusal to violate the law was the exclusive cause for employment 
termination.
61
  
In 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals expanded the Adams public policy 
exception.
62
 In Carl, the plaintiff, a part-time nurse, alleged that her 
employer terminated her because she advocated for patients’ rights and 
against her employer’s interests and served as an expert witness in medical 
malpractice cases.
63
 Ms. Carl did not violate any law, as Adams requires.
64
 
Nevertheless, the court in Carl held that Adams did “not foreclose any 
additional ‘public policy’ exceptions to the general rule that employment 
contracts are always at will unless they expressly provide otherwise.”65 
                                                          
54
 856 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
55
 See id. at 267 (discussing past case law in the District of Columbia and finding that 
no public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine has been recognized in 
the jurisdiction). 
56
 Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991). 
57
 See id. at 33 (adopting the public policy exception to the general at-will 
employment rule in a case where a company discharged its employee for refusing to 
break the law). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 34 (confining the application of the exception even further by attributing to 
the employee the burden of proof that discharge was solely because of the refusal to 
break the law). 
62
 See Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 189 (D.C. 1997) (ruling that the courts 
could expand the public policy exception recognized in Adams when appropriate) 
(hereinafter referred to as a “Carl claim”). 
63
 Id. at 160 (specifying that Ms. Carl testified before the Council of the District of 
Columbia and testified as an expert witness for the plaintiff during the aforementioned 
medical malpractice cases). 
64
 See id. at 162 (conceding that the specific exception set forth in Adams may not 
apply to the plaintiff because her retaliatory firing was not illegal under the D.C. Code). 
65
 Id. at 160. 
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Specifically, the Court decided that the past interpretation of the public 
policy exception in Adams did not preclude this court from applying it to 
other public policy exceptions when appropriate.
66
  The court commended 
Judge Schwelb’s interpretation of Adams in Gray v. Citizens Bank,67 and 
concluded that retaliatory termination of an employee for refusing to break 
the law was not the sole illustration of the public policy exception.
68
  
Rather, the courts should be careful to construe the public policy exception 
narrowly to preserve the rule.
69
  The court thus held that nothing in Adams 
precluded an application of the public policy exception to other sets of 
facts.
70
   
Therefore, employees in D.C. do not have to refuse to engage in illegal 
conduct in order to have a cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy. 
 
IV. “A” IS FOR ADLER: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN 
MARYLAND 
 
While Adler is the seminal case that confirmed a cause of action for 
wrongful termination in Maryland, subsequent decisions established the 
principal types of wrongful termination claims and the elements of a prima 
facie case. Maryland courts hold that the public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine applies in three distinct sets of circumstances: (1) where an 
employee refused to violate the law, (2) where an employee exercised a 
specific legal right, and (3) where an employee fulfilled a statutory duty.
71
 
 
                                                          
66
 See id. (deciding that the restrictive view in Adams can be expanded). 
67
 Gray v. Citizens Bank, 602 A.2d 1096, 1098 (D.C. 1992) (Schwelb, J., concurring). 
68
 See id. (deciding that the public policy exception should not be so narrowly 
construed as to allow for only one type of case, but that that question was not presented 
in Adams). 
69
 See id. (stating that courts should be conscientious when applying the exception 
and construe it narrowly).  
70
 See id. (holding that when it is warranted, the public policy exception could be 
applied to situations outside of the Adams context). 
71
 See, e.g., Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 761 (Md. 1991) 
(giving legal redress for retaliatory discharge for suing a co-worker for sexual 
harassment culminating in assault and battery); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173, 
1175 (Md. 1988) (holding that discharging an employee because they filed a workers’ 
compensation claim was against Maryland public policy); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton 
Serv. of Baltimore, Inc., 632 A.2d 463, 471 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding that 
carrying out a statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect is required by teachers and 
that Maryland protects those teachers from any dismissal or discipline for reporting 
such abuse); Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1148 (MD. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1990) (holding that firing an employee for refusing to commit the tort of invasion 
of privacy of a third-party was against public policy). 
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A. Refusing to Engage in Illegal Activity  
  
The Adler tort protects employees who were terminated because they 
refused to engage in illegal activity. Cases construing this form of protected 
conduct include: 
1. Recognizing an Adler claim where an employee was discharged after 
refusing to engage in sexual intercourse with her supervisor and thus 
“becom[ing] her boss’s prostitute.”72  
2. A human resources director alleging that she was terminated because 
she refused to submit a false insurance claim for health insurance on behalf 
of an individual who no longer worked for the company, an act that would 
amount to health care benefit fraud.
73
  
3. Recognizing an Adler claim where a resident manager of an apartment 
complex was terminated because she refused to violate tenants’ 
constitutional right to privacy by carrying out instructions to enter tenants’ 
apartments and look through their private papers in their absence.
74
  
4. Terminating an employee because she refused her supervisor’s 
inducements to engage in prostitution.
75
  
 
B. Exercising a Statutory Right  
 
Terminating an employee for exercising her statutory rights can also give 
rise to an Adler claim. Cases construing this form of protected conduct 
include: 
1. Terminating a teacher for exercising his First Amendment right by 
speaking out about a guard’s unnecessary use of force to stop a fight 
between inmates;
76
  
                                                          
72
 See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Md. 2000) 
(upholding the lower courts’ ruling and agreeing that retaliatory discharge was against 
public policy when it applied to an employee who refused to commit acts of 
prostitution).  
73
 See Magee v. Dan Sources Tech. Serv., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 258 (Ct. Spec. App. 
Md. 2001) (holding that the employee provided sufficient evidence to establish a nexus 
between the decision to discharge her and the public policy against health care benefit 
fraud). 
74
 See Kessler, 572 A.2d at 1148 (holding that it was a violation of public policy to 
fire an employee for refusing to commit the tort of invasion of privacy on behalf of her 
employer). 
75
 See, e.g., Perry v. FTData, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 699 (D. Md. 2002) (holding that it 
was against public policy for an employer to discharge an employee for refusing to 
commit prostitution). 
76
 See, e.g., De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty, 438 A.2d 1348, 1354 (Md. 1982) 
(holding that retaliatory discharge for constitutionally protected speech can give rise to 
a private cause of action).  
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2. Terminating an employee for refusing to submit to a polygraph test in 
violation of Maryland Annotated Code Article 100, Section 95, which 
prohibits lie detector tests as a condition of employment;
77
 and  
3. Discharging an employee solely because the employee filed a 
workers’ compensation claim. 78 
 
C. Fulfilling a Statutory Obligation  
  
Adler protects at-will employees who fulfill a statutory obligation of 
reporting suspected criminal behavior to law enforcement.
79
 Under this 
form of protected conduct, the employee must demonstrate that she had a 
legal obligation or duty to report the employer’s unlawful conduct.80 Note 
that in Wholey v. Sears Roebuck,
81
 the court cautioned against construing 
this form of protected conduct broadly because the legislature has not 
created a general whistleblower protection statute protecting employees 
who investigate and internally report suspected criminal activity.
82
 Cases 
construing this form of protected conduct include: 
1. Recognizing an Adler claim where a former teacher at a childcare 
facility claimed she was terminated for reporting instances of child abuse to 
a state childcare licensing agency.
83
 
2. A physicist alleging that his employment was terminated because he 
intended to “blow the whistle” on the hospital’s practice of billing 
Medicare for complex radiation calculation plans when less complex and 
less expensive calculations were actually being performed, but who had no 
statutory duty to report the hospital’s billing irregularities, failed to state 
                                                          
77
 See, e.g., Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212, 216 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1985) (stating 
that express legislative prohibition of termination of an employee for refusing a 
polygraph is violation of public policy). 
78
 See, e.g., Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. 1988) (holding that 
discharging an employee because they filed a workers’ compensation claim was against 
Maryland public policy). 
79
 See Makovi v. Sherwin Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Md. 1989) 
(discussing the cases reviewed in Adler and sorting them into three categories of: 1) 
Refusing to Commit an Unlawful Act; 2) Performing an Important Public Obligation; 
and 3) Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege). 
80
 See, e.g., Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 494 (Md. 2002) (defining the 
Legislatures intent as protection for reporting witnesses to be protected for complying 
with this civil obligation). 
81
 803 A.2d 482 (Md. 2002). 
82
 See id. at 496 (describing the protection as limited to private employees reporting 
the illegal activity externally). 
83
 See, e.g., Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Serv. of Baltimore, Inc., 632 A.2d 463, 469-
70 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1993) (describing the plaintiffs’ claims as relying on the 
statutory reporting obligation).  
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Adler claim.
84
 
3. Employees alleging that their employer closed the plant in retaliation 
for their cooperation in a state and federal prosecution for the employer’s 
toxic waste dumping, could not maintain an Adler claim because CERCLA 
provides its own procedure for employees to seek relief for such 
retaliation.
85
 
D. Elements of an Adler Claim 
 
In order to establish a case of wrongful termination, the employee must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) her employer terminated 
her; (2) her termination violated a clear mandate of public policy; and (3) 
there is a causal nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s 
decision to fire the employee.
86
 
 
V. “B” IS FOR BOWMAN: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN 
VIRGINIA 
 
While Virginia first recognized an exception to the at-will employment 
doctrine in Bowman, the Virginia Supreme Court in Rowan v. Tractor 
Supply Co.
87
 confirmed that the “narrow” exception applies in only three 
discreet circumstances: (1) the exercise of a statutory right, (2) the violation 
of statutory protections, and (3) the refusal to engage in criminal conduct.
88
 
Justice Lacy reasoned: 
 
While virtually every statute expresses a public policy of some sort, 
we continue to consider this exception to be a “narrow” exception and 
to hold that “termination of an employee in violation of the policy 
underlying any one [statute] does not automatically give rise to a 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.” In only three 
circumstances have we concluded that the claims were sufficient to 
constitute a common law action for wrongful discharge under the 
                                                          
84
 See, e.g., Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. at Easton, Md., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 400, 410 
(D. Md. 1996) (stating that because the plaintiff did not work in the billing department 
and had no statutory obligation to report the billing irregularities, his claims were 
“vague, conclusory and speculative”). 
85
 See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 629 A.2d 1293 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1993) 
(holding that the employer had not acted illegally by closing the plant, because private 
actors are not bound by constitutional restraints protecting free speech rights).  
86
 See, e.g., King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 901 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2005) 
(discussing the qualifications for bringing a wrongful termination claim). 
87
 Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 63 S.E.2d 709 (Va. 2002). 
88
 Id. at 711.  
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public policy exception.
89
 
 
The first instance, as was the case in Bowman, is when an employer 
violates a policy enabling an employee’s exercise of a statutorily created 
right.”90  
The second scenario that gives rise to a wrongful termination claim is 
when an employer violates a public policy explicitly expressed in statute 
and when the employee is a clear member of the class of persons the statute 
intends to protect.
91
 The Bailey and Lockhart cases involved discharges 
based on the public policy expressly stated in former Va. Code § 2.1-715.4 
(currently codified in § 2.2-3900).
92
 That statute provided, in relevant part, 
that it is Virginia’s policy to safeguard everyone from unlawful 
discrimination in employment based on gender.
93
 The employees in these 
cases alleged their employer terminated them because of their gender.
94
 
The third and final circumstance is when an employer discharges an 
employee for refusing to engage in a criminal act. The court in Rowan 
recognized that “although criminal statutes do not contain explicit 
statements of public policy, the protection of the general public from 
lawless acts is an unquestioned policy underlying such statutes.”95 
Therefore, allowing the employment-at-will doctrine to “serve as a shield 
for employers who seek to force their employees, under the threat of 
discharge, to engage in criminal activity” is the highest violation of public 
policy.
96
 In Mitchem, the court upheld the plaintiff’s wrongful termination 
claim based on her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with her 
supervisor and violate laws against fornication and lewd and lascivious 
behavior.
97
  
                                                          
89
 Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
90
 See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985) (holding 
that an employer may not threaten to discharge an employee to control their vote as a 
shareholder in a corporation). 
91
 See Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1997) (holding that the 
employer’s discrimination against the plaintiff because she was a woman and a 
working mother was against public policy as embodied in the Virginia Human Rights 
Act); see also Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328, 332 (Va. 
1994) (holding that discrimination and wrongful discharge based on race and gender 
are against public policy and fit into the narrow exception described in Bowman). 
92
 Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505; Lockart, 439 S.E.2d at 332. 
93
 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (West 2011). 
94
 See Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505 (explaining that the plaintiff had been terminated 
during her pregnancy because her employer found she was no longer a “dependable” 
worker); Lockart, 439 S.E.2d at 332 (describing how one of the plaintiffs was 
terminated because she refused the sexual advances of one of the managers). 
95
 Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Va. 2002). 
96
 Id. (citing Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000)). 
97
 Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 249. 
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There is no single case that sets out the prima facie elements of a 
wrongful termination claim under Bowman. However, reviewing the court 
decisions that followed Bowman, the necessary steps are the same as those 
in Maryland. A plaintiff must establish (1) that her employer terminated 
her, (2) that her termination violated a public policy of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, and (3) that there is a causal link between her termination and 
the named public policy violation.
98
 
VI. “C” IS FOR CARL: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN D.C. 
 
Although the D.C. Court of Appeals first acknowledged the existence of 
a cause of action for wrongful termination in Adams, most employment 
litigators refer to the action as a Carl claim because of the latter decision’s 
expansion of the narrow exception Adams created.
99
 As explained above, 
Carl held that an employee’s refusal to violate the law was not the only 
circumstance under which an employee can assert a wrongful termination 
claim.
100
 
As in Maryland and Virginia, D.C. courts recognize three separate 
categories of protected conduct under the exception to the employment at-
will doctrine: (1) refusing to engage in illegal activity; (2) exercising a 
constitutional or statutory right; and (3) reporting criminal conduct to 
supervisors or outside agencies.
101
 In Fingerhut v. Children’s National 
Medical Center,
102
 the plaintiff (1) refused to participate in his employer’s 
bribe of a D.C. Government official, (2) performed his legal duty as a 
security officer to inform government agencies of the bribe, and (3) 
reported the bribe to both law enforcement and internal management.
103
 
The court found that all of these activities afforded Fingerhut the ability to 
defeat his employer’s motion to dismiss.104 
The Adams and Carl decisions established the first two categories of 
actions. In Adams, the court held that the exception applies when an 
employer terminates an employee because of the employee’s refusal to 
violate the law.
105
 In Carl, the Court of Appeals affirmed that an 
employee’s exercise of her right to free speech, by means of her testimony 
against her employer in malpractice cases, also serves as the basis of a 
                                                          
98
 See Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 699 (Va. 1998); see also Eslami v. 
Global One Comm’n, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 17, 18 (1999).  
99
 See also Fingerhut v. Children’s Nat. Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 799, 805 (D.C. 1999). 
100
 Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 160 (D.C. 1997). 
101
 See Fingerhut, 738 A.2d at 803.  
102
 738 A.2d 799 (D.C. 1999). 
103
 Id. 
104
 See id. at 806–07.  
105
 See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991). 
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wrongful termination claim.
106
  
When originally asked to extend the exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine to employees who report illegal activities, the Court of Appeals 
refused to recognize such an expansion.
107
 However, Carl specifically 
overruled the decision in Gray and held that the court is free to recognize 
additional public policy exceptions.
108
 In dismissing a plaintiff’s Carl 
claim, the court ruled in Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom,
109
 that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate the existence of a legal 
obligation to report to her superiors the improper conduct which she claims 
to have observed.”110 The inference, therefore, is that a cause of action for 
wrongful termination does exist upon the showing of such a duty to report. 
Fingerhut confirmed this third category of claims in its decision the 
following year.
111
  
However, not all whistleblowing enjoys protection from retaliation under 
the public policy exception.
112
 So far, the third category of wrongful 
termination actions in D.C. appears to protect only the reporting of crimes 
and the reporting of conduct when there are legal obligations to report such 
conduct. 
Though there is no case on point regarding Carl claims, the D.C. 
Whistleblower Protection Act protects disclosures that the employee 
“reasonably believes” to evidence one or more of the circumstances 
delineated in D.C. Code § 1-615.52(6)(A)-(E).
113
 Also, as with 
discrimination reprisal cases, it is not necessary that the employee be 
correct in her disclosure. It is sufficient that the disclosing employee 
“reasonably believes” that the disclosure is of an illegal, inappropriate, 
unhealthy or unsafe practice.
114
 While these cases refer to statutory, rather 
                                                          
106
 See Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997). 
107
 See Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington, 602 A.2d 1096, 1097 (D.C. 1992) 
(concluding that only the en banc court was free to expand the public policy exception 
recognized in Adams and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on this basis). 
108
 See Carl, 702 A.2d at 160 (holding that the Adams decision did not bar the court 
from expanding the scope of the public policy exception, even when the court was not 
en banc, as was the case in Gray). 
109
 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).  
110
Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).  
111
 Fingerhut v. Children's Nat. Medical Center, 738 A.2d 799 (D.C. 1999). 
112
 See, e.g., Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 8 (D.C. 1993) (affirming the 
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for abusive discharge for reporting maintenance 
deficiencies to corporate managers).  
113
 D.C. Code § 1-615.52(6)(A)-(E) (protecting disclosures of information by 
employees when about gross mismanagement, gross misuse or waste of public 
resources or funds, abuse of authority in connection with the administration of a public 
program or the execution of a public contract, violation of a federal, state, or local law, 
or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety). 
114
 See id.; see also Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250, 1260 (D.C. 2003) 
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than common law causes of action, they are the most analogous to 
wrongful termination claims. 
D.C. courts do not explicitly outline the elements necessary to sustain a 
cause of action for wrongful termination. However, by reading the 
numerous cases deciding such claims, the requirements are the same in 
D.C. as they are in the other two jurisdictions. A discharged at-will 
employee may sue her former employer for wrongful termination when the 
sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law, as 
expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.
115
 Current case law suggests 
that an employee may prevail if the employee can show that her protected 
activity was the “primary” or “substantial” reason for the discharge.116 The 
Wallace court affirmed the dismissal of an employee’s wrongful 
termination claim because she could not demonstrate that her employer 
terminated her “solely, or even substantially for engaging in conduct 
protected by such an exception.”117 In either standard, the burden of proof 
is on the employee.
118
 The claimant must demonstrate (1) that her employer 
discharged her employment, (2) that the discharge was a violation of public 
policy, and (3) that a causal relationship exists between the discharge and 
public policy violation.
119
 
VII. TORT v. CONTRACT LEGAL BASES  
 
Some jurisdictions analyze wrongful termination claims under a tort 
theory, while others base the cause of action under contract law. Most 
jurisdictions view the action as one in tort. The generally accepted reason 
for recognizing the cause of action as a tort is that the action “vindicates an 
otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation.”120  
States that consider wrongful termination to be a contract claim 
                                                          
(citing Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (stating that the 
determination “hinges not upon whether the order was ultimately determined to be 
illegal, but whether appellant reasonably believed that it was illegal.”).  
115
 Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1260. 
116
 See, e.g., Wallace, 715 A.2d at 885 (“discharged solely, or perhaps even 
primarily,”); Davis v. Gables Residential/H.G. Smithy, 525 F.Supp.2d, F.Supp.2d 87, 
103 (D.D.C. 2007) (“sole or substantial reason”); Mastrangelo v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., CIV. 01-0582 (TFH), 2006 WL 416181 *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (“solely, or 
at least substantially”). 
117
 Wallace, 715 A.2d at 886 n. 25. 
118
 Id. 
119
 See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); see also 
Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of Apostolic Faith of Washington, D.C. v. 
Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 433 (D.C. 1996). 
120
 Richard E. Kaye, Cause of Action for Termination of At-Will Employee in 
Violation of Public Policy, 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 227 (2004 & Supp. March 2012) 
(citing Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402 (2003)).  
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understand it is an implied term of every contract of employment that 
neither party may require another party to do what the law forbids.
121
 
Courts can also use contract law to limit the size of an award to a prevailing 
plaintiff.
122
  Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. courts all recognize wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy as a tort action.
123
 
 
VIII. ELEMENT ONE: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
DISCHARGE 
 
The first step in any wrongful termination action is to establish that an 
employer discharged an at-will employee. Both Maryland and D.C. courts 
acknowledge that employees who sign a collective bargaining agreement or 
other form of employment contract still retain the protection of the public 
policy exception.
124
 To varying degrees, all three jurisdictions permit 
injured plaintiffs to assert that their employers constructively discharged 
their employment in lieu of proving involuntary termination.
125
  
 
A. Employment Contracts 
 
Maryland courts hold that even employees who sign an employment 
contract with their employer can file a wrongful termination suit. In Ewing 
v. Koppers Co., Inc.,
126
 the court held that a union member subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement could have a wrongful termination action 
against his employer who terminated him for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim.
127
 In reaching this decision, the judge reasoned: 
 
The tort action as we have recognized it is not intended to reach 
every wrongful discharge. It is applicable only where the 
                                                          
121
 See Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Ark. 2003) (citing Lucas 
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984)).  
122
 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386-87 (Ark. 1988) (fixing the 
measure of compensatory damages in a public policy wrongful discharge action to the 
sum of wages the employee would have earned under the employment contract had she 
not been discharged). 
123
 See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Md. 1981); see also 
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985); Adams v. 
George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991). 
124
 Infra VIII. A. Employment Contracts. 
125
 Infra VIII. B. Constructive Discharge. 
126
 537 A.2d 1173 (Md. Ct. App. 1988). 
127
 Id. at 1174-75. 
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discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy. Thus, 
the public policy component of the tort is significant, and 
recognition of the availability of this cause of action to all 
employees, at will and contractual, will foster the State’s interest 
in deterring particularly reprehensible conduct. Moreover, it 
would be illogical to deny the contract employee access to the 
courts equal to that afforded the at will employee. We hold that a 
cause of action for abusive discharge exists in favor of employees 
who serve under contract as well as those who serve at will.
 128
 
 
However, in that particular case, the court found that an arbitrator’s 
decision during the plaintiff’s union grievance preempted his ability to 
bring a common law tort claim.
129
 Citing Ewing, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals confirmed the availability of wrongful termination claims to union 
employees in Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
130
  
Twenty years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals followed Maryland’s lead. 
In Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C.,
131
 the court found the 
reasoning in Ewing persuasive. Referencing the decisions of California and 
Washington courts, Judge Wagner opined: 
 
The Maryland court’s reasoning is persuasive. Denying contract 
workers the public policy wrongful discharge remedy tends to 
“ignore . . . the fundamental distinction between tort and contract 
actions.” The duty giving rise to the tort remedy is not derived 
from the covenants of contract, but rather from the employer’s 
obligation to conduct its affairs in conformity with fundamental 
public policy. Recognition of the cause of action will, as the 
Maryland court observed, “foster the State’s interest in deterring 
particularly reprehensible conduct.” 132 
 
The court in Byrd II, citing heavily to the Finch v. Holladay-Tyler 
Printing, Inc.
133
 decision, also confirmed that Section 301(a) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) does not preempt tort actions for 
wrongful discharge so long as the court need not interpret the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement.
134
 Consequently, tort claims are separate 
                                                          
128
 Id. at 1175 (emphasis added).  
129
 Id. at 1179. 
130
 Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 547 A.2d 1105 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).  
131
 962 A.2d 927 (D.C. 2008). 
132
 Byrd, 962 A.2d at 934 remanded to No. 2004-CA-004412-B, 2011 D.C. Super. Ct. 
LEXIS 8 (Sept. 13, 2011) (“Byrd II”) (internal citations omitted). 
133
 586 A.2d 1275 (Md. 1991). 
134
 Byrd II, No. 2004-CA-004412-B at 67-68; see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic 
Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).  
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and independent from the collective bargaining agreement.
135
 
Maryland and D.C. courts agree that the public policy basis of the 
wrongful termination tort rises above any concerns in contract law. While 
there may be issues with preemption depending upon the terms of the 
contract in question, the existence of any written agreement between an 
employer and employee does not automatically foreclose the possibility of 
a tort claim.  
B. Constructive Discharge 
 
Many states allow an employee to assert that the employer engaged in 
conduct that compelled the employee to resign.
136
 In such circumstances, 
the employee can demonstrate a constructive discharge even though the 
employer did not terminate the employee. Constructive discharge is one 
method of establishing an illegal adverse employment decision in many 
civil rights and other employment law claims. 
 
1. Maryland 
 
In Maryland, employees do not need to prove their employers 
involuntarily terminated their employment in order to allege wrongful 
termination. Constructive discharge is sufficient to satisfy the first element 
of the prima facie case.
137
 Evidence, for example, that the plaintiff resigned 
after the employer offered the choice between resignation and termination 
will establish the requisite discharge for a wrongful termination claim.
138
 
However, the plaintiff will need to show that the employer intended to 
induce her resignation.
139
 Specifically: 
                                                          
135
 See Byrd II, 2004-CA-004412-B at 36. 
136
 
See, e.g., Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, 2005-NMSC-003, 109 P.3d 280, 
282 (N.M. 2005) (“constructive discharge is a doctrine that permits an employee to 
recast a resignation as a de facto firing, depending on the circumstances surrounding 
the employment relationship and the employee's departure.”); LeGalley v. Bronson 
Cmty. Sch., 339 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Mich. 1983) (“A constructive discharge occurs 
‘when the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so 
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.’”). 
137
 See, e.g., Beye v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1984) (“The law is not entirely blind . . . . [i]t therefore recognizes the concept of 
“constructive discharge”; in a proper case, it will overlook the fact that a termination 
was formally effected by a resignation if the record shows that the resignation was 
indeed an involuntary one, coerced by the employer.”). 
138
 Kessler v. Equity Mgmt. Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1152 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
139
 See Beye, 477 A.2d 1197, 1204 (holding that a plaintiff’s burden to prove 
constructive discharge and an employer’s intent to coerce a resignation is not met 
where plaintiff only contends that he was led to resign because he suffered from 
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[W]here a resignation is purportedly prompted by working 
conditions, the applicable standard to determine if the resignation 
is, in effect, a constructive discharge, is whether the employer has 
deliberately caused or allowed the employee’s working 
conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person in 
the employee’s place would have felt compelled to resign.140  
 
It is the responsibility of the employee to prove constructive discharge 
and the employer’s intent to provoke the resignation. 
 
2. D.C. 
 
Involuntary termination is also not the only form of discharge in D.C. A 
constructive discharge will suffice to bring a tort action for wrongful 
termination.
141
  
Establishing constructive discharge before D.C. courts is less 
troublesome than in Maryland. Specifically, an employee need not prove 
the employer intended to compel the employee to resign. In D.C., “A 
constructive discharge occurs when the employer deliberately makes 
working conditions intolerable and drives the employee into an involuntary 
quit.”142 However, nothing requires the employer to have intended to force 
the termination.
143
 Working conditions rise to the requisite level of 
intolerableness if they “would lead a reasonable person to resign.”144 There 
is also no requirement that an employee remain in an “intolerable 
workplace” for a particular period of time.145  
 
3. Virginia 
 
The Virginia Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether an 
                                                          
private, non-employment related attacks from fellow employees). 
140
 Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). 
141
 See Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1993) (affirming a 
jury verdict finding in favor of an employee’s tort claim that her constructive discharge 
constituted wrongful termination); see also Darrow v. Dillingham & Murphy, LLP, 902 
A.2d 135, 138 (D.C. 2006) (holding that constructive discharge is a sufficient basis for 
a wrongful termination action).  
142
 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. D.C. Comm. on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1101 
(D.C. 1986).  
143
 Id. (citations omitted).  
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. 
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employment discharge can be constructive.
146
 Virginia Circuit Court judges 
have reached different conclusions on the issue.
147
 
In Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc.,
148
 the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant constructively discharged her by giving her less 
desirable tasks and reducing hours after she complained of unwanted 
sexual advances.
149
 The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
Virginia public policy does not extend to constructive discharge.
150
 The 
court stated: 
 
The at-will employment relationship permits termination of 
services by the employer or the employee, for any reason. When 
the employee chooses to resign, no special rule applies. It is only 
when the employer actually terminates the employee in violation 
of some established public policy that the narrow exception is 
applied.
 151
 
 
However, the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized other causes of 
action premised upon “constructive” conduct. For example, the court 
created the doctrine of constructive desertion, which recognizes a ground 
for divorce in favor of a party even though the guilty party did not actually 
desert the marriage.
152
 Moreover, the court has judicially crafted 
constructive evictions of tenants
153
 and constructive fraud.
154
 
With this background, Virginia state and federal courts hold that “an 
employee who can meet the high burden of proving a constructive 
                                                          
146
 See Barron v. Netversant-Northern Virginia, Inc., 68 Va. Cir. 247 (2005) (citing to 
appellate court decisions to support a constructive discharge claim and noting the 
unresolved split in the state appellate circuits on the matter of whether constructive 
discharge can be used as a basis for a wrongful termination claim). 
147
 Compare Jones v. Prof’l Hospitality Res., Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458 (1995) and Wright 
v. Donnelly & Co., 28 Va. Cir. 185 (1992) (holding that Virginia does not recognize 
the tort of wrongful constructive discharge), with Dowdy v. Bower, 37 Va. Cir. 432 
(1995), and Molina v. Summer Consultants, Inc., No. 152715, 1996 WL 1065653 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. 1996) (holding that Virginia does recognize the tort of wrongful constructive 
discharge). 
148
 35 Va. Cir. 458 (1995).  
149
 Id. at 458-59.  
150
 Id. at 460-62. 
151
 Id. at 460 (emphasis added).  
152
 Brooks v. Brooks, 106 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 1959); Williams v. Williams, 50 S.E.2d 
277 (Va. 1948). 
153
 Cavalier Square Ltd. P’ship v. Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 435 
S.E.2d 392, 395 (Va. 1993). 
154
 Mortarino v. Consultant Eng’g Services, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Va. 1996); 
Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Va. 1994).  
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discharge does have standing to pursue a Bowman wrongful discharge 
claim.”155 The Honorable Randall G. Johnson ruled in Peyton v. United 
Southern Aluminum Products, Inc.,
156
 that constructive discharge is a viable 
cause of action in Virginia.
157
 The Honorable Stanley P. Klein in Behsudi 
also held that Virginia law should recognize wrongful constructive 
discharge in the workplace.
 158
 
In Behsudi, the court cited to a Fourth Circuit case when outlining the 
elements of constructive discharge: 
 
The United States Court of Appeals has recognized constructive 
discharge in the workplace. In Bristow v. The Daily Press, Inc., 
the Fourth Circuit held that “a constructive discharge occurs when 
‘an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working 
conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job.” ‘In 
order to satisfy the Fourth Circuit test, a plaintiff must allege and 
prove two elements to establish a constructive discharge: (1) the 
deliberateness of the employer’s action; and (2) the 
intolerableness of the working conditions. Under this test, 
deliberateness only exists if the employer intended to force the 
employee to quit. Intolerableness of working conditions is reached 
only when a reasonable person “in the employee’s position would 
have felt compelled to resign.”159 When the countervailing 
policies and authorities are fully considered, this Court finds that 
wrongful constructive discharge in the workplace should be 
recognized under Virginia law.
 160
 
 
In order to sustain a cause of action for wrongful constructive discharge, 
the Behsudi court held that a plaintiff must allege and prove by clear and 
convincing evidence: (1) that the employer’s conduct was “so outrageous 
in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community;” and (2) that the conduct compelling the resignation 
violated a Virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute.
161
 The 
availability of constructive discharge when asserting a Bowman claim 
remains unsettled. To the extent Virginia courts accept the theory, they 
                                                          
155
 Gochenour v. Beasley, 47 Va. Cir. 218, 222 (1998).  
156
 49 Va. Cir. 187 (1999). 
157
 Id.  
158
 Johnson v. Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. 533, 538 (1997). 
   
159
 Id. (citations omitted).   
160
 Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. at 538 (internal citations omitted).  
161
 Id. (citing Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 160 (1991); Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 
S.E.2d 412, 412 (1989); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806 
(1996).  
2013]  THE ABCS OF COMMON LAW WRONGFUL TERMINATION 219 
 
follow the stricter standard of requiring a showing of intent on behalf of the 
employer. 
IX. ELEMENT TWO: SOURCES OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
The primary analysis courts conduct on any wrongful termination claim 
is if the public policy violation the plaintiff alleges cites to a viable basis 
for the cause of action. In addition to there being various sources of public 
policy, each jurisdiction also establishes general limitations and 
requirements when pleading wrongful termination claims. 
 
A. General Limitations and Pleading Requirements 
 
1. Maryland 
 
Adler defined “public policy” as a “principle of the law which holds that 
no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the 
public or against the public good.”162 In Maryland, the public policy cited 
in support of a cause of action for wrongful discharge must represent a 
“clear mandate of public policy.”163 The public policy in question must be a 
“preexisting, unambiguous, and particularized pronouncement” that directs, 
prohibits, or protects the conduct in question.
164
 In Wholey, the court 
explained: 
 
A public policy must be clearly mandated to serve as a basis for a 
wrongful discharge action because that “limits judicial forays into 
the wilderness of discerning ‘public policy’ without clear 
direction from a legislature or regulatory source.” “When a 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his or her grievance is anything 
more than a private dispute regarding the employer’s execution of 
normal management operating procedures, there is no cause of 
action for [wrongful] discharge.” 165 
 
                                                          
162
 Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981). 
163
 Id. at 471; see also Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590, 602 (Md. Ct. 
App. 2003).  
164
 Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 788 A.2d 242, 245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) 
(citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 A.2d 642, 661 (Md. Ct. App. 2001)), 
aff’d, 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003). 
165
 Wholey, 139 A.2d at 650. 
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In other words, the public policy must be a specific, discrete, written 
mandate and not an assumption or inference regarding the public good. 
While there is no heightened pleading requirement for an Adler claim, a 
plaintiff must plead with specificity the public policy the employer violated 
by discharging the plaintiff.
166
 “A complaint must plead with particularity 
the source of the public policy and the alleged violation.”167  
A plaintiff must also show that her conduct advanced the public interest 
supported by the policy or that the defendant’s conduct impaired that 
interest.
168
 However, it is unlikely that an employee must demonstrate an 
actual violation of public policy. The motivation behind an employee’s 
conduct is also irrelevant. In Lawson v. Bowie State Univ.,
169
 the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that the personal motivation of a whistleblower 
under Maryland Annotated Code, State Personnel & Pensions § 5-305 is 
not grounds for denying whistleblower protections.
170
 Though Lawson 
refers to a specific Maryland whistleblower statute, the rationale is 
applicable to other similar causes of action, such as those under Adler. 
While some jurisdictions have held that when the cited statute 
establishing a public policy does not expressly cover an employee or an 
employer no claim will lie, Maryland disagrees with this rule. For example, 
the court in Molesworth v. Brandon
171
 determined that an employee can 
maintain a claim against an employer that was too small for coverage under 
the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”).172 Exempt 
employers simply need not adhere to the administrative process of the Act. 
They are not, however, exempt from the policy announced.  
In some circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to ground a claim on a 
public policy conferring rights on another person, not just the plaintiff 
personally.
173
 However, Maryland courts will not hold an employer liable 
                                                          
166
 See Denro, 605 A.2d at 1022 (holding that plaintiff failed to set forth with 
sufficient specificity the allegations necessary to demonstrate that her employer 
discharged her for refusing to violate two federal criminal statutes).  
167
 Porterfield, 788 A.2d at 245 (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 
A.2d 760, 764-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Denro, 605 A.2d at 1022).  
168
 See Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
termination of employee for suggesting that she may want to seek advice of counsel 
before responding to unfavorable work evaluation did not violate the public policy 
generally favoring access to counsel).  
169
 26 A.3d 866 (Md. Ct. App. 2011). 
170
 Id. at 877; see also Horton v. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a government employee’s personal and vindictive motive in reporting his 
supervisor’s misconduct is not relevant to the issue of whether the disclosure is a 
protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Protection Act).  
171
 672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996). 
172
 Id. 
173
 See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) 
(holding that termination of apartment complex manager for refusal to “snoop” in 
tenants’ apartments violated public policy because manager’s “snooping” would have 
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when the policy identified by the plaintiff primarily benefits the 
defendant.
174
 Nevertheless, only an “important” or a “strong” public policy 
is actionable in Maryland.
175
 For example, a public policy favoring self-
defense is inadequate to support the claim of an employee discharged for 
fighting.
176
  
 
2. Virginia 
 
Virginia courts define “public policy” as the underlying existing laws 
designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or 
welfare of the people in general. Therefore, the exception is not so broad as 
to make actionable those discharges of at-will employees that violate only 
private rights or interests.
177
 In Miller,
178
 the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that the private rights established by the employer’s internal regulations 
had no impact upon any public policy. The plaintiff should attempt to show 
that the right asserted benefits society as a whole rather than the plaintiff 
individually.
179
  
Furthermore, the employee stating a claim for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy must be an intended beneficiary of the public 
policy in question.
180
 In Dray v. New Market Poultry Products, Inc.,
181
 
employee April Dray was a quality control inspector at a plant that 
processed and distributed poultry.
182
 Dray believed that the plant was not 
                                                          
violated tenants’ right to privacy under federal constitution).  
174
 See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 497-98 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that employer’s discharge of store employee for investigating suspected theft 
by a store manager did not violate public policy since plaintiff had no public duty to 
investigate the theft and only a duty to protect the store’s property which primarily 
benefited the defendant).  
175
 Id. at 499 (holding that the public policy must be strongly supported by binding 
authority). 
176
See Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg. Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 312 (1995) (holding that 
acting in self-defense is not protected by public policy).  
177
 See Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (Va. 1987). 
178
 Id. at 915. 
179
 Id. at 919. 
180
 City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 523 S.E.2d 239, 245 (Va. 2000) (citing Dray v. 
New Market Poultry Prod., Inc., 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (Va. 1999)) (holding that the 
plaintiff police officer was attempting to use the criminal code as a shield to protect 
himself, not the public, from the consequences of his decision to charge his supervisor 
with obstruction of justice despite the captain’s order to take no further action); see also 
Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709 (Va. 2002) (holding that the goal of the 
obstruction of justice penalties is not to protect individuals from intimidation, but to 
protect the public from a flawed legal system due to impaired prosecution of criminals).  
181
 518 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1999). 
182
 Id. 
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following proper sanitary rules and was distributing adulterated poultry.
183
 
Dray informed government inspectors and was ultimately fired. Dray 
brought a wrongful termination claim, asserting that her employer violated 
the public policy underlying the Virginia Meat and Poultry Products 
Inspection Act.
184
 The Court held that Dray had not stated a claim for 
wrongful discharge because the statute in question only intended to 
establish an intrastate regulatory mechanism for commerce, not protect “the 
public good” generally.185 The Commonwealth’s public policy regarding 
inspections of meat and poultry products did not create a protected class of 
which Ms. Dray was a member.
186
 
As in Maryland, a public policy sufficient to support a claim for 
wrongful termination in Virginia must be clear and explicit.
187
 There is no 
room for courts to interpret, extrapolate, or assume the legislature’s 
creation of a public policy. The language of the statute in question should 
be unambiguous. Similarly, the plaintiff should endeavor to establish with 
as much specificity as possible the public policy in question and the 
employer’s violative conduct.188 
Recently, on November 1, 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that 
a plaintiff could bring a wrongful discharge claim against an individual 
who was not the plaintiff's actual employer, such as a supervisor or 
manager, but who participated in the wrongful firing of the plaintiff.
189
 In a 
complaint before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia, Angela VanBuren alleged that both her employer, Virginia 
Highlands Orthopedic Spine Center, LLC, and her supervisor, Dr. Stephen 
Grubb, terminated her employment because she refused to engage in 
criminal conduct, specifically adultery in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-365 
and open and gross lewdness and lasciviousness in violation of Va. Code § 
18.2-345. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified the 
issue of individual liability under the tort for wrongful discharge to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia.   
In support of its holding that individual employees can be held liable for 
their own conduct, the Court cited to previous decisions where Virginia 
courts held individual supervisors and managers culpable for their actions 
                                                          
183
 Id. 
184
 Id.  
185
 Id.  
186
 Id. 
187
 See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996) 
(holding that to succeed in a wrongful discharge action, employee must identify a 
statutory basis for the identified public policy and that in the case of a dealership 
employee’s refusal to repair an automobile because he felt the repair would be unsafe, 
no such statute existed). 
188
 Id.  
189
 VanBuren v. Grubb, 120348, 2012 WL 5358706 (Va. Nov. 1, 2012).   
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effecting the termination under review.
190
 Though not discussed in those 
previous decisions, the legal theory behind individual liability is the well-
settled rule in Virginia that “employers and employees are deemed to be 
jointly liable and jointly suable for the employee's wrongful act.”191 Under 
tort law, agents and employees are personally liable for their own torts.   
 
3. D.C. 
 
In expanding the “very narrow” exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine Adams created, Carl held that future requests to recognize such 
exceptions should be only on a “case-by case basis.”192 The court ruled it 
would “consider seriously only those arguments that reflect a clear mandate 
of public policy—i.e., those that make a clear showing, based on some 
identifiable policy that has been ‘officially declared’ in a statute or 
municipal regulation, or in the Constitution, that a new exception is 
needed.”193 Furthermore, there must be a “close fit” between the policy 
cited and the employer’s conduct at issue.194 With that background, the 
court in Carl rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to glean a public policy 
exception from the rules of evidence and other sources related to expert 
testimony in medical malpractice cases.
195
 Analogous to the decisions in 
Maryland and Virginia, an employee in D.C. asserting a wrongful 
termination claim will need to proffer a written, explicit public policy basis 
and demonstrate that she is logically among those the public policy 
purports to protect. 
D.C. courts have been more lenient with regard to the pleading 
requirements in wrongful termination actions. There is no case that requires 
a plaintiff to plead the public policy an employer allegedly violated with 
specificity. In Freas v. Archer Services, Inc.,
196
 the court found that though 
the plaintiff did not plead a specific statutory provision in his original 
complaint, “a complaint is sufficient so long as it fairly puts the defendant 
on notice of the claim against him.”197 The test of sufficiency is not 
                                                          
190
 See Bowman, 229 Va. at 540; see also Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106.   
191
 Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 483–84; see also Miller v. 
Quarles, 242 Va. 343, 347, 410 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1991) (“Both principal and agent are 
jointly liable to injured third parties for the agent's negligent performance of his 
common law duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.”).   
192
 Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1997).  
193
 Id.  
194
 Id.  
195
 Id. 
196
 716 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1998). 
197
 Id. at 1002 (citing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. §§ 8(a), (e); Scott v. District of 
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whether the plaintiff cited to a specific statute, but whether she informed 
the defendant of the nature of her civil action.
198
 The Freas court ruled that 
because the defendant had the opportunity to litigate the issue raised by the 
public policy in question during its own motion to dismiss, it necessarily 
had knowledge of the public policy basis of the plaintiff’s claim.199 
 
B. Sources of Public Policy and Relationship with Other Statutes  
 
Despite courts’ attempts to narrow and limit the scope of the public 
policy exception to the at-will doctrine, the various sources of public policy 
courts accept when reviewing wrongful termination claims continue to 
expand. As described in Adler: 
 
Nearly 150 years ago Lord Truro set forth what has become the 
classical formulation of the public policy doctrine that to which 
we adhere in Maryland: “Public policy is that principle of the law 
which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a 
tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good, 
which may be termed, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the 
law, or public policy in relation to the administration of the 
law.”200  
 
. . . But beyond this relatively indeterminate description of the 
doctrine, jurists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly 
workable definition of public policy. Not being restricted to the 
conventional sources of positive law (constitutions, statutes and 
judicial decisions), judges are frequently called upon to discern 
the dictates of sound social policy and human welfare based on 
nothing more than their own personal experience and intellectual 
capacity. . . .  Inevitably, conceptions of public policy tend to ebb 
and flow with the tides of public opinion, making it difficult for 
courts to apply the principle with any degree of certainty.
201
 
 
The public policies outlined below are only a sample of the most popular 
and most cited sources. 
                                                          
Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C.1985)).  
198
 Id. 
199
 Freas, 716 A.2d at 1002; see also Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762 (D.C. 1978) 
(“parties have impliedly contested a matter . . . [where] the party contesting the [matter] 
received actual notice of the injection of the unpleaded matters, as well as an adequate 
opportunity to litigate such matters and to cure any surprise from their introduction”).  
200
 Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 1, 196 (1853). 
201
 Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471-72 (Md. 1981) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  
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1. State Statutes and Constitutions 
 
The clearest undisputed source of public policy is state statue. State 
legislative and regulatory acts are the most obvious manifestations of 
public policy within a state.
202
 These include statutorily created rights, 
criminal prohibitions, and liabilities for tort violations.
203
 In some states, 
the only public policies courts recognize as sufficient to support a wrongful 
discharge claim are those articulated in the state’s statutes, constitution, and 
administrative regulations.  
While this is not the case in Maryland, the majority of wrongful 
termination cases in Maryland do cite to state statutes and regulations.
204
 
Adler also protects employees who report crimes to government 
agencies.
205
  
In Carl, the D.C. Court of Appeals specifically recognized that an 
employee could anchor a wrongful termination suit “either in the 
Constitution or in a statute or regulation.”206 Applying that standard, the 
court concluded that Carl made a sufficient showing to justify a public 
                                                          
202
 See Adler, 432 A.2d at 472 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 
(1930)) (“The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and 
variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional 
or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at 
all, only with the utmost circumspection.”). 
203
 See, e.g., Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that retaliating against an employee who reported a crime as a witness is a 
criminal offense and therefore a sufficient basis for a public policy in a wrongful 
termination action); Kessler, v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1990) (recognizing the existence of a public policy pertaining to the tort of 
invasion of privacy as having its source in both statutory and constitutional provisions). 
204
  See, e.g., Wholey, 803 A.2d at 57-60 (MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27, §§ 760-762 (now 
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 9-301 to 9-304)); Insigna Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 
755 A.2d 1080, 1087 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 15 
(repealed 2001)); Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608, 616 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 49B § 14 (repealed 2009)); Watson v. People Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 588 A.2d 760, 767 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 49B § 14-18 
(repealed 2009)); Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. Ct. App. 
1988) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 101, § 39A (now MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 
9-1105)); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Serv. of Balt., 632 A.2d 463, 469 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1993) (citing MD. CODE ANN. §§ 5-502(b), 5-702(1), 5-704(a)); Kessler, 
572 A.2d at 1149-50 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 101, § 39A(a); MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY CODE §§ 26(q), 29; MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 8-301 through 8-332, 8-
401); Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212, 216-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (citing MD. 
CODE ANN. Art. 100, § 95).  
205
 See, e.g., Bleich, 632 A.2d 463, 469-71 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM.LAW §§ 5-
502(b), 5-702(1), 5-704(a)(2) (holding that a teacher’s allegations that her employer 
terminated her for sending a letter to the state licensing specialist to report child abuse 
or neglect were sufficient to support a wrongful discharge claim). 
206
  Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1997). 
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policy exception based on D.C. Code § 1-224 (now codified as D.C. Code 
§ 1-301.43), which prohibits intimidating witnesses.
207
 The Adams court 
cited to the municipal prohibition against operating a vehicle without a 
valid inspection sticker as a valid source of public policy.
208
 
The first recognition of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine 
in Virginia cited to a shareholder’s statutory right to vote without 
coercion.
209
 In Mitchem v. Counts,
210
 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld 
the plaintiff’s assertion that her employer wrongfully terminated her 
employment after she refused to perform sexual acts in violation of 
Virginia Code Annotated §§ 18.2-344 and 345, which prohibit fornication 
and lewd and lascivious cohabitation. 
 
2. Workers’ Compensation 
 
Many different types of statutes may express a public policy sufficient to 
support a wrongful termination claim. One class of such statutes includes 
those that explicitly regulate the employment relationship. The clearest 
example is a statute that prohibits an employee’s discharge under specified 
circumstances, such as in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation 
claim. This falls within the category of exercising a statutory right, which 
all three states recognize. Wrongful termination claims based on employees 
seeking workers’ compensation benefits were among the first wave of such 
actions after courts first recognized the common law tort. 
In order for a Maryland plaintiff to show that she came within the ambit 
of the public policy protecting workers, she must show that she filed a 
claim for monetary benefits arising from an injury sustained during 
employment.
211
 In Ewing, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled: 
 
Discharging an employee solely because that employee filed a 
worker’s compensation claim contravenes the clear mandate of 
Maryland public policy. The Legislature has made a strong 
statement to that effect in making such conduct a criminal offense, 
and our perception of the magnitude of the public interest in 
preserving the full benefits of the worker’s compensation system 
to employees, and deterring employers from encroaching upon 
                                                          
207
 Id. at 165. 
208
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 33 (D.C. 1991) (citing D.C. 
MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 602). 
209
 See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985) (citing VA. 
CODE 1950. § 13.1-32). 
210
 523 S.E.2d 246, 251 (Va. 2000).  
211
 See Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 586 A.2d 1275, 1278 (Md. Ct. App. 
1991); see also Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 491–92 (Md. Ct. App. 2002).  
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those rights, is equally strong.
212 
 
 
However, because of the language of Maryland’s workers’ compensation 
statute, section 9-1105 of the Labor and Employment Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code,
213
 an employee must prove that the sole reason 
for the discharge was the employee’s filing of a workers’ compensation 
claim.
214
 Section 9-1105 states, in part, “An employer may not discharge a 
covered employee from employment solely because the covered employee 
files a claim for compensation under this title.”215 This is a higher standard 
of causation than the “motivating factor” test outlined later in this paper.216 
An employer’s termination of an employee for being absent from work 
due to a work-related injury also comes within the protection of the public 
policy safeguarding the right to workers’ compensation benefits. This is not 
the case in Maryland when the employer applies an absence-discharge 
policy without regard to an employee’s workers’ compensation status.  See 
Kern, 66 Md. App. 441. 
217
 When making this conclusion, the court held 
that “an employee’s protection from discharge in retaliation for claiming 
statutory benefits does not include protection for excessive absence from 
work due to work-related injury.”218 Once an employee becomes disabled 
and is no longer qualified to perform her job duties, an employer may 
terminate that employee when the period of disability is not determinable. 
In such cases, the inability of the employee to perform assigned 
responsibilities, not the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, serves 
as the reason behind termination. 
Virginia’s workers’ compensation statute is substantially similar to 
Maryland’s. The statute reads, “No employer or person shall discharge an 
employee solely because the employee intends to file or has filed a claim 
under this title or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under 
this title.”219 It also requires the same “sole reason” causation standard.220 
                                                          
212
 Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis 
added).  
213
 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. EMPL. § 9-1105. 
214
 Kern v. South Baltimore General Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1986); Ewing, 537 A.2d at 1175. 
215
 § 9-1105 (emphasis added). 
216
 See infra at 55, 56. 
217
 See Kern v. South Balt. Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
218
 Id. at 452.  
219
 VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308(a).  
220
 See Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, Inc., 483 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1997) (“So the timing 
of these events and the employer's knowledge that the employee was “reporting” the 
injury, without more, does not raise an inference that the plaintiff was fired solely 
because she intended to file a workers' compensation claim. Otherwise, a question of 
fact on this issue would arise in every case merely upon proof that an employee had 
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However, unlike the Maryland statute, the Virginia Code provides 
employees with a private right of action in state circuit court.
221
 
Consequently, a claim of retaliation for asserting workers’ compensation 
rights does not fall within the gamut of a common law Bowman claim.
222
 
The Virginia legislature passed section 65.2-308 in 1991, six years after 
Bowman. While there are no cases holding that the statutory cause of action 
under section 65.2-308(b) preempts a common law Bowman claim, there is 
no evidence that anyone attempted to assert a wrongful termination claim 
based on workers’ compensation rights prior to the enactment of section 
65.2-308(b). 
Like Virginia, D.C. courts recognize a statutory cause of action for 
retaliatory discharge for filing, or attempting to file, a workers’ 
compensation claim.
223
 Section 32-1542 subjects an employer who violates 
the section to paying between $100 and $1,000, and further provides that 
the employee receives reinstatement and compensation for lost wages.
224
 
To establish a claim, an “employee must prove that she made or attempted 
to make a claim for worker’s compensation” and that her employer 
discharged her in retaliation for making the claim.
225
 An employee’s 
attempt to make a claim for benefits is neither confined to the formal filing 
of a worker’s compensation claim nor limited to claims for money.226 
Nevertheless, not “every act by an employee ostensibly in pursuance of 
compensation benefits constitutes a claim or attempted claim for 
compensation.”227 
Unlike Virginia, the D.C. Court of Appeals explicitly ruled that the 
statutory provisions of D.C.’s Workers’ Compensation Act preclude an 
employee from asserting a common law wrongful termination claim under 
Adams and Carl.
228
 In so holding, the Nolting court reasoned: 
. . . [W]e are dealing here with a statutory provision which not 
only creates the wrong but also contains a specific remedy to 
compensate the person suffering that wrong. No such statute was 
involved in Adams; there was no administrative or other remedy 
                                                          
been fired after a work-related injury.”). 
221
 See Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-308(b).  
222
 See Shaw v. Titan Corp, 498 S.E.2d 696, 700 (Va. 1998); see also Dunn v. Bergen 
Brunswig Drug Co., 848 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1994).  
223
 See Abramson Associates, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Employment 
Services, 596 A.2d 549, 552 (D.C. 1991); see also District of Columbia Workers’ 
Compensation Act § 43, D.C. CODE § 32-1542 (1980) (formerly D.C. CODE § 36-342).  
224
 Id. 
225
 Lyles v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs. (Lyles II), 572 A.2d 81, 
83 (D.C. 1990).  
226
  Id.; Dyson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1065, 
1067 (D.C. 1989).  
227
 Dyson, 566 A.2d at 1067. 
228
 See Nolting v. Nat’l Capital Group, Inc., 621 A.2d 1387, 1387 (D.C. 1993). 
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available to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff in Adams 
would have gone uncompensated if the court had refused to 
recognize a public policy tort. In the case sub judice, appellant 
does not stand in that same position; she is not facing a situation 
in which the only possibility for compensation for her claimed 
injury is the recognition by this court of a public policy tort 
expansive enough to cover her situation.
 229
 
 
The issue of preclusion is outlined in more detail later in this paper.
230
 
While all three jurisdictions protect employees from retaliation for 
exercising their rights under state workers’ compensation laws, only 
Maryland permits the use of those statutes in common law tort actions for 
wrongful termination. Both Virginia and D.C. require plaintiffs to pursue 
their statutory remedies in lieu of seeking tort damages. 
 
3. Jury Service 
 
Courts usually predicate recognition of a wrongful discharge claim for 
jury service on the characterization of jury service as an important public 
obligation or service.
231
 As with workers’ compensation rights, Maryland, 
Virginia, and D.C. have all passed statutes prohibiting employers from 
terminating an employee for complying with a court order to serve on a 
jury.
232
  
In Maryland, “An employer may not deprive an individual of 
employment or coerce, intimidate, or threaten to discharge an individual 
because the individual loses employment time in responding to a [jury] 
summons…or attending, or being in proximity to, a circuit court for jury 
service under this title.”233  
Section 18.2-465.1 of the Virginia Annotated Code states, “Any person 
who is summoned to serve on jury duty…shall neither be discharged from 
employment, nor have any adverse personnel action taken against him,…as 
a result of his absence from employment due to such jury duty.” 234 
The statute in D.C. not only prohibits an employer from threatening or 
otherwise coercing an employee because the employee serves as a juror, 
                                                          
229
 Id. at 1389 (emphasis added). 
230
 See infra at 38, 60, 61. 
231
  See, e.g., Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or. 220 (1989).    
232
 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-501; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1; D.C. 
CODE § 11-1913. 
233
 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-501.  
234
 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1. 
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but also provides a cause of action for the recovery of wages lost if an 
employer discharges an employee for serving as a jury.
235
 
There are no state cases in any of the three jurisdictions regarding the use 
of jury duty protective statutes as the public policy basis of a wrongful 
termination suit. The only citations to any of the statutes listed above are 
from federal court decisions in Virginia discussing section 18.2-465.1 of 
the Virginia Annotated Code. 
In Sewell v. Macado’s, Inc.,236 the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia refused to answer the question if the jury service statute 
permits a claim of wrongful termination.
237
 It reasoned, “[A] federal court 
exercising diversity jurisdiction only is permitted to rule upon the state law 
as it currently exists and not to surmise or suggest its expansion.”238 
Conversely, the Eastern District of Virginia cited to section 18.2-465.1 as 
one of the few bases on which an employee could assert a Bowman 
claim.
239
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit inferred its 
support of the theory when it affirmed a lower court decision that the 
plaintiff did not allege that her employer terminated her because she would 
be absent from work, but because her employer did not like the fact she 
was testifying against another employee.
240
 While these cases are not 
binding on Virginia state courts, they mirror the trend across the country 
that, by either statute or common law, employers cannot terminate 
employees because of their jury service obligations. 
 
4. Internal Policies and Suing the Employer 
 
In most jurisdictions, an employer’s internal policies do not rise to the 
level of a public policy that can form the basis of a wrongful termination 
claim. Even if the employer terminates an employee after a false accusation 
of conduct that violates company policy, the employee cannot generally 
challenge the termination as repugnant to public policy.  
This is the state of the law in both Maryland and Virginia. In Beery v. 
Maryland Medical Laboratory, Inc.,
241
 the plaintiff claimed her employer 
terminated her after a co-worker wrongly accused her of violating the 
                                                          
235
 D.C. CODE § 11-1913. 
236 No. Civ.A. 7:04CV00268, 2004 WL 2237074 (W.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2004). 
237
 Id. 
238
 Id.  
239
 White v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1549 (E.D. Va. 1990) aff’d, 939 
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Oakley v. May Dept. Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 
(E.D. Va. 1998).  
240
 Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 108 F. App’x. 110, 112 (4th Cir. 2004).  
241
 597 A.2d 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
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company’s policy against theft.242 According to the court, even if the 
plaintiff had been guilty of the theft, her termination would have been 
appropriate. “Firing her on the basis of a fellow employee’s unsubstantiated 
allegations, without proof and, indeed, without fully investigating the 
matter, may very well have been improper-even foolish-but can hardly be 
said to contravene any clear mandate of public policy.”243  
The Virginia Supreme Court similarly held that an employer’s 
contravention of its own rules does not violate public policy.
244
 Thus, when 
an employer terminates an employee for violating the employer’s rules or 
because she expresses a disagreement with such rules, the employer will 
not be liable.
245
 In Miller, the plaintiff appeared as a witness on behalf of an 
employee before an internal grievance review panel.
246
 Two weeks later, 
the employer terminated the plaintiff for unsatisfactory performance.
247
 The 
court reasoned: 
 
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the employer’s act in 
discharging her was done in retaliation for her exercise of the right 
given to all employees by SEVAMP’s “Personnel and 
Administrative Procedures” manual to file grievances and to 
testify freely before grievance review panels. But such a retaliatory 
act would impinge only upon private rights established by the 
employer’s internal regulations. It would have no impact upon any 
public policy established by existing laws for the protection of the 
public generally.
248
 
 
There is no D.C. court decision regarding the viability of a Carl claim 
based on an employer’s own internal policies. However, given the 
limitation of wrongful termination claims to violations of a “clear mandate 
of public policy,” such as those “officially declared in a statute or 
municipal regulation,” there is no reason to believe D.C. courts would rule 
differently than their counterparts in Maryland and Virginia.
249
  
Absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there 
ordinarily is no violation when an employer discharges an at-will employee 
                                                          
242
 Id. at 519. 
243
 Id. at 523.  
244
 See Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915 (Va. 1987) (refusing to recognize a 
public policy violation based on a right to file grievances as the right was primarily 
created by the employer’s handbook). 
245
 Id. at 919.  
246
 Id. at 916.  
247
 Id. 
248
 Id. at 919 (emphasis added).  
249
 Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1997).  
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in retaliation for that employee’s suit against the employer.250 In Watson,251 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with other states, holding, “There 
is no clear mandate of public policy which would make actionable Peoples’ 
discharge of Watson if that discharge were motivated solely by Watson’s 
initial claims against Peoples.”252 However, “a retaliatory discharge in 
response to an employee’s seeking legal redress against a co-worker 
because of . . . assault and battery” does satisfy the requirement of a clear 
mandate of public policy under Adler.
253
 There are no known cases in 
Virginia or D.C. on this issue. 
 
5. Discrimination  
 
No one can argue that safeguards against discrimination in the workplace 
reflect a valid and enforceable public policy. To this effect, Congress and 
the legislatures in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. have all passed statutes 
prohibiting employers from discriminating against their employees.
254
 
However, those same statutes provide specific relief for discriminatory and 
retaliatory discharges that, in many cases, preclude common law tort 
actions. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),255 provides in 
section 2000e-2 that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discharge any individual…because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”256 Section 2000e-3 also 
prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee for opposing a 
discriminatory action or making a charge of discrimination.
257
 Congress 
later passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(“ADEA”),258 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),259 to 
protect employees from discrimination and retaliation based on age and 
                                                          
250
 See Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983); 
Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So.2d 761 (Ala. 1982); Becket v. Welton Becket & 
Assocs., 114 Cal.Rptr. 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, 
506 A.2d 379, 380 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
251
 Watson v. People Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. App. 1991). 
252
 Id. at 765-66.  
253
 Id. at 767.  
254
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991); Md. Code 
Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 to 20-609 (2009); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 to 2-1402.12 
(2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 to 2.2-3902 (2001) (formerly VA. CODE § 2.1-715); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (1985). 
255
 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
256
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  
257
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. 
258
 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967). 
259
 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117 (2008). 
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disability, respectively. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency responsible for enforcing these 
acts, has established administrative procedures that claimants must follow 
to assert their rights under these statutes.  
Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. each have their own local 
antidiscrimination statutes. These statutes cover the same protected classes, 
and often more, than those of their federal counterparts. Maryland passed 
the Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”)260 in 1965. D.C. enacted the 
Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”)261 in 1977. Virginia created the Virginia 
Human Rights Act (“VHRA”)262 and Virginians with Disabilities Act 
(“VDA”)263 in 1987 and 1985, respectively. Since these statutes contain 
their own administrative and legal remedies, they are generally not able to 
serve as a basis for common law wrongful termination claims. 
Maryland courts hold that the source of the policy against discrimination, 
such as hostile work environment sexual discrimination, is statutory and 
“exclusively statutory.”264 The court reasoned that state statutes provide the 
remedies for their violation. Thus, the wrongful termination tort would not 
reach an employer’s retaliation if the employee based her suit on 
discrimination, hostile work environment, or other prohibited acts.
265
 In 
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., the plaintiff filed a tort action for 
wrongful termination after receiving the EEOC’s notice of her right to 
sue.
266
 Makovi alleged that her employer based her dismissal on sex 
discrimination in violation of federal law and FEPA.
267
 The court held that 
the tort of wrongful termination is unavailable where a statute that carries 
its own remedy expresses the public policy to be vindicated.
268
 Because 
Title VII and FEPA provided a remedy for Makovi’s alleged employment 
discrimination, “the generally accepted reason for recognizing the tort, that 
of vindicating an otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation, 
                                                          
260
 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-601 to 20-609 (2009) (original version at MD. 
CODE ANN., Art. 49B). 
261
 D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 to 2-1402.12 (2006). 
262
 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 to 2.2-3902 (2001) (original version at VA. CODE § 
2.1-715). 
263
 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (1985). 
264
 Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 766 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).  
265
 See id. (citing Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc., 578 A.2d 766 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1990)) (holding that the existence of statutory federal and state remedies for 
discharge of an employee in retaliation for reporting allegedly illegal discrimination 
claims preempt tort claim for abusive discharge); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 
561 A.2d 179 (Md. Ct. App. 1989).  
266
 Makovi, 561 A.2d at 180. 
267
 Id. 
268
 Id. at 609.  
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[did] not apply.”269  
Despite Makovi, the Maryland Court of Appeals “left open the prospect 
of an action for abusive discharge lying when the discharge violated a 
mandate of public policy independent of the employment discrimination 
laws.”270 In Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton,271 the plaintiff argued her 
employer wrongfully terminated her employment because she refused to 
acquiesce to a form of quid pro quo sexual harassment that would have 
amounted to an act of prostitution under Maryland Annotated Code, Article 
27, Section 15.
272
 The court explained: 
 
Preclusion under Makovi, we iterated, applies only when the 
public policy sought to be vindicated “is expressed in a statute 
which carries its own remedy for vindicating that public policy.” 
Preclusion was not mandated, however, simply because the 
assault and battery arose out of workplace sexual harassment. We 
explained that public policy, manifested in both the civil and 
criminal law, provided sanctions against the harmful and offensive 
touching of the person, whether or not sexually motivated, long 
before either Title VII or Art. 49B was enacted, and that, had 
those statutes never been enacted, that independent mandate of 
public policy would have supported [a plaintiff’s] recourse against 
the co-worker. Thus, we noted, there were “multiple sources of 
public policy, some within and some without Title VII and [Art. 
49B]” and that, “[b]y including prior public policy against sexual 
assaults, the anti-discrimination statutes reinforce that policy; they 
do not supersede it.” 273 
Watson, the precursor to Ashton, similarly held that discharging an 
employee for pursuing legal action for workplace sexual harassment is 
against public policy.
274
 
Various federal court decisions in D.C. hold that antidiscrimination laws, 
such as the DCHRA, can serve as the public policy basis of a common law 
wrongful termination claim.
275
 These rulings, however, are not binding on 
                                                          
269
 Id. at 626.  
270
 Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080, 1084 (Md. Ct App. 2000) 
(emphasis added).  
271
 Id. at 1080. 
272
 Id. at 1081 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27 § 15 (2000) (current version at MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-301)). 
273
 Id. at 1086 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life 
Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 768 (Md. Ct. App. 1991)). 
274
 Watson, 588 A.2d at 766. 
275
 See MacNabb v. MacCartee, 804 F. Supp. 378, 381 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Buttell 
v. Am. Podiatric Med. Assoc., 700 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.D.C. 1988) (“Discrimination 
based on age, like discrimination based on race or gender, is a violation of the clear 
mandates of public policy”); Alder v. Columbia Historical Soc’y, 690 F. Supp. 9, 17 
(D.D.C. 1988) (“[P]laintiff’s claims [of race and gender discrimination], if proven, 
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D.C. “state” courts.276  
Contravening the holdings of the U.S. District Court for D.C., the D.C. 
Court of Appeals held that the DCHRA preempts the public policy 
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. In Carl, the seminal case in 
D.C. on the common law tort, the court opined: 
The Council [of D.C.], of course, has shown that it knows how to 
cover a field; we would be entirely off base if we were not to 
conclude that the Council had preempted, for example, the legal 
fields represented by the exhaustive list of Human Rights Act 
prohibitions against discrimination in employment, or the 
comprehensive Rental Housing Act rules governing evictions of 
tenants at will, or the detailed Workers Compensation Act 
provisions addressing on-the-job injuries.
 277
 
 
In McManus v. MCI Communications Corp.,
278
 the court confirmed that 
it already rejected the argument that a wrongful termination claim does not 
rise when there is an alleged statutory violation.
279
 Having previously 
concluded that the employer did not violate the employee’s rights under the 
DCHRA, the McManus court ruled there was no room to make the 
argument again under Carl.
280
 
Virginia court decisions mirror those of Maryland and D.C. In Doss v. 
Jamco,
281
 the Virginia Supreme Court held that “in amending the [VHRA] 
by adding subsection D to Code section 2.1-725 in 1995,
282
 the General 
Assembly plainly manifested its intention to alter the common law rule 
with respect to ‘[c]auses of action based upon the public policies reflected 
in [the VHRA].’”283 Subsection D states, “Causes of action based upon the 
public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those 
                                                          
would appear to implicate a statutorily expressed public policy, defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the wrongful discharge claim is denied”)).  
276 
Though D.C. is not a state, it maintains its own court of general jurisdiction, the 
Superior Court of D.C., and appellate court, the D.C. Court of Appeals. For issues of 
local, not federal, law, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court and court of last 
resort in D.C. 
277
 Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 171 (D.C. 1997) (emphasis added).  
278
 748 A.2d 949 (D.C. 2000) (regarding a wrongful discharge claim based on racial 
and personal appearance discrimination).
 
279
 McManus, 748 A.2d at 957. 
280
 Id. (citing Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. 1998) (“there is 
no need to apply the Carl rationale because the legislative policy [in the statute 
allegedly violated] is explicit and may apply directly to [appellee’s] alleged discharge 
of [appellant]”). 
281
 Doss v. Jamco, 482 S.E.2d 441 (Va. 1997). 
282
 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (1995) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
2639(D) (2011)).  
283
 Doss, 492 S.E.2d at 446.  
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actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or 
state civil rights statutes or local ordinances.”284  
Following Doss, the court next addressed the scope of the VHRA in 
Conner v. National Pest Control Association.
285
 There, the plaintiff alleged 
that she had asserted a valid cause of action for wrongful termination 
because, in addition to the public policy against gender discrimination in 
the VHRA, her employer’s conduct violated the same public policy 
embodied in sources other than the VHRA, such as Title VII.
286
 The court 
disagreed, holding that “the General Assembly eliminated a common law 
cause of action for wrongful termination based on any public policy which 
is reflected in the VHRA, regardless of whether the policy is articulated 
elsewhere.”287 However, in line with the Ashton decision in Maryland, 
Virginia courts permit wrongful termination claims related to, but not 
specifically covered by, the VHRA.
288
  
 
6. Public and Occupational Health 
 
While safeguarding the health of the public at large should be a clear 
source of public policy, court rulings on the issue are mixed. Most states, 
including Maryland and Virginia as well as D.C., maintain numerous 
statutory provisions that intend to protect the health of their residents. 
Those explicit statutes can serve as the public policy basis of a wrongful 
termination claims. Absent an explicit mandate, however, most courts 
refuse to recognize a general public policy exception. 
In Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc,
289
 the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland denied an employee’s wrongful termination claim 
based on the state’s interest in promoting a health care system that provides 
financial and geographic access to quality health care at a reasonable cost 
to all citizens.
290
 The employee, a doctor and Director of Medicine, raised 
concerns regarding the hospital’s refusal to pursue certain goals of a 
previously expressed strategic plan, reductions in the hospital work force, 
delays in X-ray and laboratory reporting, and lack of effective mechanisms 
                                                          
284
 § 2.2-2639(D).  
285
 513 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 1999). 
286
 Id. at 399. (“Specifically, Conner relied on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e”). 
287
 Id. at 400. 
288
 See Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246 (Va. 2000) (holding that an employer’s 
termination of an employee for refusing to engage in a sexual relationship violated the 
Commonwealth’s public policies against fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior 
embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 and 345). 
289 
614 A.2d 1021 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
290
Id. at 1033-34. 
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for communication between the hospital and its staff.
291
 After bringing 
those issues to the attention of the Medical Executive Committee, the 
hospital terminated the complainant.
292
 In denying the employee’s Adler 
claim, the court found, “While a quality health care system accessible to all 
is undoubtedly a desirable goal, appellant’s assertion that it represents a 
well-established public policy finds no support in any specific Maryland 
legislation.”293 
The Hrehorovich court cited primarily to Lee
294
 as the basis of its 
decision. In Lee, the employer discharged the employee after the employee 
protested deviations from proper testing procedures and attempts to deceive 
a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) inspector.295 The employee 
alleged that her termination contravened a federal public policy of 
“promotion of maximum achievable safety in air transportation.”296 The 
court concluded that the employee’s dispute with her employer was private, 
notwithstanding her allegation of an “amorphous [public] policy concern” 
of safety in air transportation.
297
 
On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
dismissal of a wrongful termination claim based on violations of federal 
regulations on drug labeling;
 298
 the Federal Trade Commission Act
299
 and 
the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.
300
 Debra Parks alleged that 
Alpharma’s marketing of Kadian, a slow-release form of morphine, as 
compatible with other opiates and failure to note on the drug’s label that it 
should not be taken with alcohol posed a danger to public health.
301
 The 
Court held that the federal and local statutes and regulations cited did not 
create a clear mandate of public policy.
302
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 Id. at 1024. 
292
 Id. 
293 
Id. at 1034. 
294
 Lee v. Denro, 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
295
 Id. at 1020. 
296 
Id.   
297
 Id. at 1024-25 (concluding that the employee failed to prove that she was 
discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy of the state and that the 
discharge was nothing more than a private employer-employee dispute).  
298
 See Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 25 A.3d 200, 203 (Md. 2011) (dismissing Parks’ 
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Parks 
failed to prove her employer violated a clear mandate of public policy necessary to 
sustain a cause of action for wrongful termination). 
299
 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). 
300 Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301 (2011). 
301
 Parks, 25 A.3d at 206 (describing Parks’s claim that the pharmaceutical company 
fired her in retaliation for expressing her concerns about the lack of appropriate 
warnings on the drug’s label).  
302
 Id. at 214-16 (citing Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 490-91 (Md. Ct. 
App. 2002)). 
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The Consumer Protection Act . . . does not provide the specificity 
of public policy that we have required to support a wrongful 
discharge claim. The extent of the public policy mandate 
contained in the Act supports the breadth of its enforcement, but 
undermines its utility in the context of a wrongful discharge claim, 
for, as said in Wholey, “policies should be reasonably discernible 
from prescribed constitutional or statutory mandates,” to ensure 
that our decisions to extend the tort of wrongful discharge 
emanate solely from “clear and articulable principles of law.” 303 
 
Again, the Court wanted a specific expression of public policy, not a 
broad or general mandate attempting to protect the public good.
304
 
Regarding occupational safety, Maryland relies upon statutory causes of 
action. The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MOSHA”) 
promulgates state safety and health regulations in the workplace and 
incorporates corresponding federal regulations.
305
 Under section 5-604(b) 
of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code:  
 
An employer or other person may not discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because the employee: (1) 
files a complaint under or related to this title; (2) brings an 
action under this title or a proceeding under or related to this 
title or causes the action or proceeding to be brought; (3) has 
testified or will testify in an action under this title or a 
proceeding under or related to this title; or (4) exercises, for 
the employee or another, a right under this title.
306
 
 
An employee who believes her employer discharged or otherwise 
discriminated against her in violation of this act can only submit a 
written complaint to the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
307
 
Consequently, common law wrongful termination claims under Adler 
are unavailable for employees who raise occupational safety and health 
concerns.
308
 
 
Nothing in MOSHA purports to give an employee any private 
right of action in court for violation of a health and safety 
standard. Indeed, even for a violation of § 43, expressly 
                                                          
303
 Parks, 25 A.3d at 214. 
304
 Id. 
305
 MD. CODE ANN. § 5-101 to 5-1001 (2011). 
306
 § 5-604(b). 
307
 § 5-604(c)(1). 
308
 Id. 
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prohibiting an employer from discharging or discriminating 
against employees for exercising rights under MOSHA, the 
remedy afforded is a complaint to the Commissioner, who 
alone is authorized to file an action to restrain the violation 
“and for other appropriate relief including rehiring or 
reinstatement of the employee to his former position with 
back pay.
309
 
 
Maryland federal courts set the stage for this decision. In Meadows v. 
Container Research Corp.,
310
 Judge Young held that “the exclusive remedy 
for a MOSHA related wrongful discharge” was under section 5-604 and 
that a tort action under Adler did not exist for such a discharge.
311
  
Similarly, the Virginia General Assembly provides a statutory cause of 
action for any employee terminated for filing a safety or health complaint. 
Under section 40.1-51.2:1 of the Virginia Annotated Code, regarding the 
safety and health of working conditions: 
 
No person shall discharge or in any way discriminate against 
an employee because the employee has filed a safety or health 
complaint or has testified or otherwise acted to exercise rights 
under the safety and health provisions of this title for 
themselves or others.
 312
 
 
Under statute, an employee must first submit a complaint to the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
313
 Only if the Commissioner refuses 
to issue a charge against the employer can the employee seek redress from 
the courts.
314
 Given this statutory cause of action, there is no need to rely 
upon Bowman and the common law tort of wrongful termination. However, 
there is no statute or case that specifically precludes a Bowman claim based 
on this section of the Virginia Code. 
In D.C., health regulations without statutory remedies can serve as the 
basis of a Carl claim. In Washington v. Guest Services, Inc.,
315
 the Court of 
                                                          
309
 Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 520 A.2d 1124 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987). 
310
 Id. at 1127. 
311
 Meadows v. Container Research Corp., No. Y-82-3353, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17371 (D. Md. 1983). 
312
  VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2:1 (2011); see also Ligon v. Cnty. of Goochland, 689 
S.E.2d 666, 669 (Va. 2010) (explaining Virginia courts generally do not recognize a 
common law tort claim for retaliatory discharge, but the State has provided a statutory 
remedy for employees discharged for filing a safety or health complaint). 
313
 § 40.1-51.2.2 (“The employee shall be prohibited from seeking relief under this 
section if he fails to file such complaint within the 60-day time period.”). 
314
 Id.  
315
 718 A.2d 1071 (D.C. 1998). 
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Appeals retroactively applied the holding in Carl and overruled the 
Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer: 
 
The health and food regulations which we have cited…are 
expressions of a clear public policy proscribing, in the interest of 
public health, the preparation, service or sale of adulterated or 
contaminated food. Conduct that imperils the health and safety of 
the elderly residents of a retirement home, who, as a group, are 
particularly vulnerable to the kind of practice here alleged, is 
obviously contrary to the public policy of this jurisdiction, and 
Guest Services has not seriously argued the contrary.
316
 
 
The plaintiff in Washington instructed a coworker to cease spraying 
stainless steel cleaner in the area where the plaintiff was preparing food for 
the employer’s elderly residents.317 The plaintiff also informed her 
coworker that her actions were in violation of several laws and 
regulations.
318
 The plaintiff’s supervisor overheard this conversation and 
terminated the plaintiff the next day for insubordination.
319
 The court found 
that foreclosing such a cause of action would undermine the purposes of 
food and health regulations.
320
 
As in Maryland and Virginia, the Council of the District of Columbia 
also establishes local laws regarding occupational safety and health.
321
 Also 
in line with the other two jurisdictions, D.C. law prohibits employers from 
retaliating against employees because they filed complaints or participated 
in proceedings under applicable laws.
322
 Aggrieved employees may file 
retaliation complaints with the D.C. Occupational Safety and Health 
                                                          
316
 Id. at 1080 (emphasis added). 
317
 Id. at 1072.(explaining that Washington worked as a cook in a retirement home 
and knew that the stainless steel cleaner was poisonous and that many of the residents 
were in ill health, and was therefore concerned about the health implications from 
having the spray come in contact with the food). 
318
 Id. at 1023. 
319
 Id. at 1072-1073 (describing how Washington’s employer had told the co-worker 
to spray the cleaner and thought that Washington’s order to her co-worker to stop 
spraying was insubordination). 
320
 Id. at 1080 (“[T]o permit an employee to be fired for such actions would 
undermine the purposes of the food and health regulations and would frustrate the 
public policy of which these regulations are an expression.”). 
321
 D.C. CODE §§ 32-1101 to 32-1124 (2011). 
322
 See § 32-1117(a) (“No person shall discharge or discriminate against an employee 
because an employee has filed a complaint, instituted or caused to be instituted a 
proceeding pursuant to this chapter, testified or is about to testify in a proceeding, 
exercised a right afforded by this chapter on behalf of the employee or others, or 
performed any duty pursuant to this chapter").  
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Commission.
323
 Employees may seek judicial review of the Commission’s 
decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
324
 Though there is no case on point, 
D.C. courts will likely not entertain common law wrongful termination 
claims citing only to D.C. occupational safety and health regulations. 
7. State and Federal Wage Claims 
In general, state and federal statutes regarding minimum wage and 
overtime cannot serve as the basis of a wrongful termination claim. 
However, Maryland courts recently found a small corollary to this rule. 
In Chappell,
325
 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the existence of 
remedy under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) precluded an at-
will employee from making a common law tort claim for retaliation.
326
 The 
court also determined that the availability of a civil remedy under the 
FLSA when there was no similar remedy under Maryland law also 
precluded the possibility of an Adler claim.
327
 The Court of Special 
Appeals reaffirmed the Chappell decision in Shabazz v. Bob Evans 
Farms.
328
 
In a recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland 
added an interesting twist to the preemption doctrine. In Randolph v. ADT 
Security Services, Inc.,
329
 the court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
wrongful termination claim despite their simultaneous FLSA retaliation 
count.
330
 Judge Chasanow opined: 
 
Thus, it may be that, if Plaintiffs have a viable cause of action 
under the FLSA, the tort of abusive discharge would not be 
available to them. Counts I [FLSA Retaliation] and II [Wrongful 
                                                          
323
 § 32-1117(b) (providing that an employee who believes that he or she has been 
discharged or otherwise discriminated against must file the complaint within 60 days of 
the discriminatory violation). 
324
 § 32-1117(d) (“An employer or employee aggrieved by a decision rendered by the 
Commission pursuant to this action is entitled to review by the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in accordance with § 2-510.”); see infra Section X.A. regarding 
preemption. See also infra Section XI A. 
325
 Chappell v. S. Maryland Hosp., Inc., 578 A.2d 766 (Md. 1989). 
326
 Id. at 774 (holding specifically that the existence of civil remedies under federal 
and state law precluded the application of a tort remedy to his discharge action).  
327
 See id. at 773-74; see also Magee v. Dansources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 
231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
328
 Shabazz v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 881 A.2d 1212, 1224 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2005). (holding that the statutory remedy created by Article 49B (the Maryland statute 
prohibiting employer discrimination), provided an exclusive remedy and precluded a 
tort claim against individual supervisors for back pay). 
329
 701 F. Supp. 2d 740  (D. Md. 2010). 
330
 Id. at 749. 
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Termination], then, would then be considered alternative theories 
of recovery.
331
 
 
While this decision does not overrule the holding that federal and state 
statutory remedies preclude state common law claims, under the theory of 
alternate pleading, it permits plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss 
potentially preempted claims.
332
 
 
8. Federal Statutes and Regulations 
 
The ability to cite to state statutes and regulations as sources of public 
policy is well settled and uncontroverted. Various courts recognize that 
federal public policy may properly form the basis for a wrongful 
termination suit in state court.
333
 Maryland and D.C. courts concur.
334
 The 
courts in other jurisdictions, such as Virginia, do not extend the sources of 
public policy to include federal statutes and regulations. 
Maryland federal court, in the similarly titled Adler v. Am. Standard 
Corp. (“Adler II”),335 found that federal statutes could serve as the basis for 
a wrongful termination claim because no Maryland state court ruled 
otherwise.
336
 Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
found that federal regulations do not constitute Maryland public policy for 
the purpose of an Adler wrongful termination claim.
337
 While these federal 
decisions are not binding on state courts, they are representative of the 
mixed decisions of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
                                                          
331
 Id. at 748.  
332
 See id. 
333
 See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D. Md. 1982) 
(citing McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1117-19 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tameny 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Cal. 1980); Harless v. First National 
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 272-73 (W.Va. 1978)) (holding that in an abusive discharge 
action under Maryland law, violations of federal law may form the basis for the public 
policy contravened by the discharge). 
334
 Adler 538 F. Supp. at 572; De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty, Md, 438 A.2d 1348 
(Md. 1982); Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); 
Lee v. Denro, 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Wholey v. Sears, Robuck, 
803 A.2d 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Liberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); MacIntosh v. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 355 F. Supp. 2d 223 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
335
 Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 572. 
336
 Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 578-79 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)). 
rev’d on other grounds Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).  
337
 See Szaller v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 
employer did not violate a clear mandate of Maryland public policy by allegedly 
discharging employee for reporting alleged violations by the employer of Food and 
Drug Administration regulations addressing the proper collection of blood).  
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When creating the common law tort of wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy, the Adler I court cited to cases that confirmed applicability 
of federal public policies.
338
 Specifically, the court outlined: 
 
In Harless v. First National Bank, discharge of an at will bank 
employee in retaliation for the employee’s efforts to force the 
bank to comply with state and federal consumer credit laws was 
held to be actionable because the discharge contravened a 
“substantial public policy principle” the protection of consumers 
covered by the state and federal legislation.
339
 
 
However, the court neither outright confirmed nor denied that federal 
statutes constitute public policy in Maryland. It simply pointed out that it 
did not “confine…itself to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions 
or administrative regulations when determining the public policy of this 
State.”340 This ambiguity led to some confusion in Maryland state and 
federal courts. However, a review of pertinent case law leads to the 
conclusion that the definition of public policy does include federal laws.  
Some Maryland state courts reviewed federal statutes as the basis of a 
public policy exception without stating that they did, in fact, constitute a 
public policy of Maryland. In a footnote in Lee,
341
 the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland admitted, “We assume without deciding that an 
employee can base a claim for wrongful discharge under Maryland law on 
an asserted violation of public policy exhibited by violation of federal 
statutes.”342 The plaintiff argued that his employer violated federal fraud 
and obstruction of justice statutes, specifically, sections 1001 and 1505 of 
the title 18 of the United States Code.
343
 Ruling on the substance of those 
claims, the court found that the plaintiff did not state a claim for wrongful 
termination because she did not allege how her employer affirmatively 
attempted to silence her or persuade her to lie to an FAA inspector.
344
 
Though the court stated that an employee could use a federal statute as the 
public policy basis of a wrongful termination claim, it disclaimed that it did 
                                                          
338
 Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 468 (Md. 1981) (citing Tameny, 610 
P.2d at 1330; Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275-76). 
339
 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275). 
340
 Id. at 472; see also Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760 (Md. 
1991). 
341
 Lee v. Denro, Inc., 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
342
 Id. at 1021. (citing Phipps v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
343
 Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1021-22. 
344
 Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1022. 
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not decide the matter and limited its assumption to a footnote.
345
 Such 
opinions are dicta and do not create binding precedent. 
In King, the same court held that “ERISA section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, 
provides a remedy for employees who are terminated for reporting 
corporate wrongdoing to the proper authorities…[and] does not provide 
protection for intra-employment conduct…[or] a remedy to appellant.”346 If 
ERISA, a federal statute, did not qualify as a public policy in Maryland, 
there would have been no need for the court to review the content of the 
federal statute to determine if it applied to the appellant’s assertions. 
However, Maryland courts were not always so coy and subtle in 
expanding application of Adler to include federal public policy. In Magee, 
the plaintiff argued that her discharge was in retaliation for her refusal to 
violate the healthcare fraud provisions of section 24 and 1347 of title 18 of 
the United States Code.
347
 This federal statute makes it a crime to 
knowingly defraud a healthcare benefit program.
348
 Because the court 
found no civil remedy that would provide the plaintiff redress for 
retaliation, it held she could state a claim under the public policy 
exception.
349
 In response to the defendant’s argument that the federal 
statutes did not rise to the level of an applicable public policy, Judge Akins 
opined: 
 
We disagree. This criminal statute could not be clearer; it 
constitutes a strong and clear public policy mandate against filing 
fraudulent health insurance claims. Thus, Magee’s evidence of 
health care benefit fraud satisfied the second “unvindicated public 
policy mandate” element of an abusive discharge cause of 
action.
350
 
 
Given these three decisions, there is sufficient support that Maryland 
accepts federal statutes as public policy within the state, so long as those 
federal statutes do not carry their own remedial measures. 
Constitutional provisions and principles also provide clear public policy 
mandates applicable to wrongful discharge claims.
351
 In DeBleecker,
352
 the 
                                                          
345
 Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1021. 
346
 King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (citing King 
v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003). 
347
 Magee v. Dansources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 257 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2001).   
348 
18 U.S.C. § 24 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012). 
349 
Magee, 769 A.2d at 257. 
350
 Id. 
351
 See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 492 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Constitutional provisions and principles also provide clear public policy mandates, 
under which a termination may be grounds for a wrongful discharge claim."). 
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Maryland Court of Appeals held that the employment at-will doctrine was 
inapplicable if the discharge was a result of an employee’s exercise of his 
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights.
353
 Similarly, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized a public policy exception based 
on a citizen’s right to privacy in Kessler.354 Kessler’s employer, an 
apartment complex, terminated Kessler after she refused to enter the 
apartments of tenants whose rent was overdue to “snoop” through private 
papers in search of information regarding their place of employment, 
wages, etc.
355
 The court held that there existed both statutory and 
constitutional protections against such invasions of privacy.
356
 
The inability to cite to federal statute as the source of a public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine is clear in Virginia. A Bowman claim must 
rest upon Virginia public policy, not federal statute.
357
 In Bailey,
358
 the 
Virginia Supreme Court opined: 
 
That contention makes interesting rhetoric, but it disregards the 
settled law that any narrow exception to Virginia’s employment-
at-will doctrine must be based on a specific Virginia statute in 
which the General Assembly has established a public policy that 
the employer has contravened. And, as I have said, there is no 
Virginia statute expressly prohibiting defendant’s conduct.359 
 
In Lawrence, to which Bailey cites, the court explained: 
 
In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were permitted to 
pursue causes of action against their former employers, identified 
                                                          
352
 De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland,438 A.2d 1348, 1353 (Md. 1982).   
353
 Id. at 1352-53. De Bleecker was employed by Montgomery County as a teacher at 
a detention center, and alleged he was dismissed for speaking out about a guard’s use 
of violent force to quell an altercation. De Bleecker alleged this was a violation of his 
constitutional right to free speech. Id. at 1349.     
354
 Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-1151 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App. 
1990). 
355
 Id. at 1146-47. 
356
 Id. at 1149. 
357
 Oakley v The May Dep’t Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 1998); 
McCarthy v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829 (E.D. Va. 1998); 
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va. 1996); see 
also Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441, 443-44 (Va. 1997); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, 
480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1997). 
358
 Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505. 
359
 Id. at 506 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Lawrence v. Chrysler 
Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va. 1996); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 
362 S.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Va. 1987); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 
797, 801 (Va. 1985)). 
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specific Virginia statutes in which the General Assembly had 
established public policies that the former employers had 
contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart, 
Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a 
public policy that Lawrence Chrysler violated. We also reject 
Brooks’ attempt to expand the narrow exception we recognized in 
Bowman by relying upon so-called “common law duties of the 
dealership.”360 
 
Though Bowman does not explicitly state that Virginia statutes are the 
only sources of public policy, the Virginia Supreme Court clarified in its 
subsequent decisions that Bowman’s reliance on a specific Virginia statute 
as the basis of the public policy exception tailored the cause of action to 
derive from only state laws.
361
 
Conversely, D.C. federal courts have consistently cited to federal statutes 
and regulations as potential sources of public policy in wrongful 
termination actions. In Liberatore v. Melville Corp.,
362
 the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant on a claim where the plaintiff alleged his 
employer terminated him because he threatened to report the temperature 
control problem in his pharmacy to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).363 The plaintiff cited to FDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 210.1(b) 
and § 211.142(b), as well as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
364
 The jury 
subsequently found for the plaintiff.
365
 More recently, in MacIntosh v. 
Building. Owners and Managers Association International,
366
 the D.C. 
federal court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
wrongful termination count that cited to the False Claims Act
367
 as the basis 
of her Carl claim.
368
 The court held: 
 
[Defendant] contends that plaintiff has not pointed to any specific 
statute or regulation and has thus failed to establish a “clear 
                                                          
360
 Lawrence, 465 S.E.2d at 809. 
361
 Oakley, 17 F. Supp. at 535-36; McCarthy, 999 F. Supp. at 829; Lawrence, at 809; 
see also Doss, 492 S.E.2d  at 443-44; Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505. 
362
 Liberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
363
 Id. at 1327-28. The trial court dismissed Libatore’s wrongful discharge action for 
failure to state a claim within the public policy exception set forth in Adams. Id. at 28 
(citing Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991)). 
364
 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
365
 Liberatore, 168 F.3d at 1328. 
366
 MacIntosh v. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 355 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
367
 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
368
 MacIntosh, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
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mandate of public policy” justifying an exception to the at-will 
doctrine. In response, plaintiff identifies a federal statute, the 
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000), that criminalizes 
using false records or documents to induce the Government to pay 
a fraudulent claim. Because plaintiff alleged that BOMA fired him 
for refusing to inflate BOMA’s contractor expenses, plaintiff has 
pointed to a clear mandate of public policy as expressed in a 
federal criminal statute, satisfying both the broad standard 
announced in Carl and the narrower rule from Adams.
369
  
 
Most recently, in Myers v. Alutiiq Int'l Solutions,
370
 the D.C. District 
Court held that the plaintiff’s reporting of wrongdoing in connection with 
government contracting fell within the public policy exception to an at-will 
employment relationship.
371
 It found that the federal statute at issue
372
 
reflected a “clear public policy of encouraging government employees to 
come forward and report possible problems in federal programs.”373 The 
Myers court also cited to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”)374  
The Superior Court of D.C. and the D.C. Court of Appeals have not 
addressed the issue whether federal statutes can serve as the public policy 
basis for a Carl claim. While there is no reason to infer that D.C. courts 
would not follow in the steps of its federal counterparts, D.C. local and 
federal courts have disagreed with each other in the past regarding the 
recognition of the common law tort.
375
 Given the expansive interpretation 
D.C. courts have afforded Carl, it is safe to assume, for the time being, that 
federal statutes and regulations qualify as sources of public policy for 
wrongful termination claims. 
 
C. Other Sources of Public Policy 
 
The above sections outline current case law on some of the sources of 
public policy for wrongful termination actions in Maryland, Virginia, and 
D.C. The topics above are by no means an exhaustive list of possible 
                                                          
369
 Id. at 228 (emphasis added).  
370
 Myers v. Alutiiq Int’l Solutions, LLC., No. 10-2041, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
102013 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2011). 
371
 Myers, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102013 at 14. 
372
 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2008). 
373
 Id. at 12.  
374
 Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.505, 3.101-1, and 3.903). 
375
 Compare Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and 
Newman v. Legal Servs Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Hall v. 
Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
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sources of public policy, but include the most common sources. Because 
the cause of action for wrongful termination is a common law claim, courts 
can expand and reinterpret the elements and bases over time. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland confirmed this sentiment. 
 
While it is possible that a clear mandate of public policy may exist 
in the absence of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
pronouncement, this possibility “should be accepted as the basis 
of judicial determination, if at all, only with the upmost 
circumspection.” Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 64 Md.App. 
55, 61-62, 494 A.2d 239 (1985) (quoting Patton v. United States, 
281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930)); see also Bagwell, 106 Md.App. at 495-
96, 665 A.2d 297 (“[R]ecognition of an otherwise undeclared 
public policy as a basis for judicial decision involves the 
application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of the case, a 
practice which should be employed sparingly, if at all.” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lee, 91 Md.App. at 831, 
605 A.2d 1017 (noting that, although “Maryland appellate courts 
have decided several cases involving [wrongful] discharge claims 
since Adler, they have never found such a claim to be stated 
absent a discharge which violates a public policy set forth in the 
constitution, a statute, or the common law.”)376  
 
In Adler itself, the court pointed out that it did not “confine . . . itself to 
legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions or administrative regulations 
when determining the public policy of [the] State.”377 While Maryland and 
D.C. may be more prone to expanding the definition of what constitutes 
public policy, the courts in Virginia remain firm in their conviction that 
only Virginia statutes can form the public policy basis of a wrongful 
termination claim. 
Some of the most influential alternate sources of public policy are codes 
of professional ethics. New Jersey remains one of the only jurisdictions to 
confirm that such codes qualify as an expression of public policy.
378
 
Maryland, in Makovi, recognized that a code of professional ethics could 
                                                          
376
 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 779 A.2d 408, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec App. 2001) 
aff’d sub nom. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) 
(citations omitted).  
377
 Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981); see also Watson v. 
People Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 766-67 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).  
378
 See Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (holding that “in 
certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public 
policy" but excluding codes of ethics designed only to serve the interests of a 
profession (as opposed to a public interest) and codes only concerned with technical 
regulations). 
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constitute a source of public policy.
379
 However, the court simply stated 
generally that some courts have recognized a cause of action for employees 
fired for “refusing to violate a professional code of ethics.”380 In Carl, the 
D.C. Court of Appeals held that an employer’s termination of an employee 
for acting in accordance with his or her personal moral beliefs does not 
violate public policy.
381
 The court ruled that the a specific statute protecting 
the right to testify before the legislature—not the general public policy 
protecting the right to speak out—provided a concrete policy supporting a 
wrongful termination claim. However, the court in Wallace appeared to 
regard the Rules of Professional Conduct for members of the D.C. bar as 
theoretically sufficient to create an applicable public policy.
382
 The court 
ultimately found that no such rule required the plaintiff’s whistleblowing 
conduct in that case.
383
 
There are some creative avenues available to bring wrongful termination 
claims based on codes of professional conduct and ethics in Virginia. For 
example, plaintiffs can argue that Virginia’s recognition of the American 
Nursing Association’s (“ANA”) Code of Ethics establishes that code as a 
viable public policy basis for a Bowman claim. Section 54.1-100 of the 
Virginia Annotated Code, confirms the Commonwealth’s authority to 
regulate certain professions in order to protect the public interest.
384
 
Nursing is an example of such a profession. Consequently, the Virginia 
Board of Nursing maintains the ability to revoke a nurse’s license for 
“practicing in a manner contrary to the standards of ethics.”385 The Virginia 
Department of Health, Public Health Nursing program recognizes the ANA 
Code of Ethics as a basis for its standards of practice. Therefore, the 
Virginia Annotated Code, within its sections 54.1-100 and 54.1-3007, and 
along with the regulations of the Virginia Department of Health, 
incorporate the ANA Code of Ethics by reference. A plaintiff nurse 
terminated for refusing to violate the ANA Code of Ethics can use these 
references to support her wrongful termination claim under Bowman. 
                                                          
379
 Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 182 (Md. Ct. App. 1989)..  
380
 Id. (citing Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public 
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983)). 
381
 Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997). 
382
 Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
383
 Id. at 886. 
384
 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-100 (1988) (“The right of every person to engage in any 
lawful profession, trade or occupation of his choice is clearly protected by both the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia. The Commonwealth cannot abridge such rights except as a reasonable 
exercise of its police powers when it is clearly found that such abridgment is necessary 
for the preservation of the health, safety and welfare of the public."). 
385
 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3007 (2005).  
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While there is no case law on point, this theory, and similarly creative 
arguments, are worth testing before a judge. 
 
X. ELEMENT THREE: STANDARD OF CAUSATION 
 
The standard of causation in wrongful termination claims in Maryland, 
Virginia, and D.C. is not overtly clear. A plaintiff can argue in all three 
jurisdictions that she need only demonstrate that the defendant’s public 
policy violation was a “motivating factor” in its decision to terminate her. 
However, only Virginia courts provide a clear determination that this is the 
proper standard. In Maryland and D.C., plaintiffs must infer the standard 
from other case law. 
In Maryland, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s motivation 
for terminating her violated public policy.
386
 The Court of Special Appeals, 
in its decisions in Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc.,
387
 and Bagwell,
388
 held 
that a plaintiff must show that the reason for an employee’s discharge was 
“wrongful.” In Townsend, the court concluded that the mere reliance on the 
results of the polygraph test, even if the employer had wrongfully required 
the employee to take the test, did not violate public policy.
389
 “Even if some 
unlawful animus contributed to the ultimate employment decision, liability 
does not necessarily attach,” particularly where the decision would have 
been the same with or without the animus.
390
 Put another way: 
 
The question is not whether discharging [the employee for his 
arguably improper conduct] was fair, justified, sensible, 
reasonable, or appropriate. Rather, the question is whether it was 
wrongful, i.e., whether it violated a clear mandate of public 
policy. Absent that type of violation, employers can discharge at-
will employees for no reason or even for a bad reason.
391
 
 
Case law regarding mixed cases and other forms of retaliatory discharge 
hold that the plaintiff need only show that the unlawful motive was “a 
motivating factor” for the discharge.392 The Heller court considered the 
                                                          
386
 See, e.g., Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003).  
387
 Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 494 A.2d 239, 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
388
 Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1995). 
389 
Townsend, 494 A.2d at 247.
 
390
 Brandon v. Molesworth, 655 A.2d 1292, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).  
391
 Shapiro v. Massengill, 661 A.2d 202, 215 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); see also 
Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 312. 
392
 See Brandon, 655 A.2d at 1306-07; see also Magee v. DanSources Technical 
Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 253-54 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (agreeing that the 
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burden of persuasion in an action for retaliatory discipline brought pursuant 
to the Maryland Whistleblower Statute. Noting the statute provided that 
“[t]his subtitle does not prohibit a personnel action that would have been 
taken regardless of a disclosure of information,” it held that “[a] 
whistleblower action by the employee intended to overturn a personnel 
action . . . will succeed only if the employee shows by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the protected disclosure was a ‘contributing factor’ in the 
decision to take the personnel action.”393  
Maryland courts, in a recent decision by the Court of Appeals, confirmed 
that, whether “mixed” or “single” cases, the correct test for determining 
retaliatory discharge claims is whether the protected conduct was a 
“motivating factor” in the discharge.394 The court confirmed that the 
Molesworth decision does not include a holding that a “but for” instruction 
is required in a retaliatory discharge case. Furthermore, the court found that 
a theoretical distinction between “single motive” and “mixed-motive” cases 
is of no consequence whatsoever.
395
 Both courts concluded: 
 
We believe Maryland law to be settled that a plaintiff’s burden is 
to prove that the exercise of his or her protected activity was a 
“motivating” factor in the discharge, thereby creating burden-
shifting to the defendant. An instruction that imposes upon a 
plaintiff the burden of proving that the exercise of his or her 
protected activity was the “determining” factor in the discharge 
from employment is a misstatement of the law, and erroneous.
396
 
 
Virginia courts are clearer regarding an employee’s burden in Bowman 
claims. In Shaw, 255 Va. at 542-43, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that 
a plaintiff claiming wrongful termination must demonstrate that the reason 
for discharge violated Virginia’s public policy.397  
A plaintiff is not required to prove that the employer’s improper motive 
was the sole cause of the wrongful termination.
398
 In reaching that 
conclusion, the court differentiated the common law claim of wrongful 
termination from the statutory cause of action under state workers’ 
                                                          
Molesworth standard is a “motivating factor” and not “but for” causation); Dep’t of 
Natural Res. v. Heller, 892 A.2d 497, 499,(Md. Ct. App. 2006).  
393
 Heller, 892 A.2d at 510 (citing MD. CODE, STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302 (1997)).  
394 
See Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md, Inc., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2008) aff’d sub nom. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 17 A.3d 676 
(Md. Ct. App. 2011). 
395
 Gasper, 17 A.3d. at 686. 
396
 Gasper, 960 A.2d at 1234; Gasper, 17 A.3d at 686. 
397 
Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1998).
 
398
 Id. 
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compensation laws. While section 65.2-308 of the Virginia Annotated 
Code specifically forbids an employer from discharging an employee 
“solely because the employee intends to file or has filed” a workers’ 
compensation claim, there is no similar requirement for common law 
claims.  
Virginia’s common law standard of proximate causation requires a 
plaintiff to prove that her employer discharged her because of any 
combination of unlawful factors. In such cases, the common law of 
Virginia does not require the court to give the jury an explicit instruction 
setting forth “but for” language.399 More recently, in Schmidt, et al. v. 
Triple Canopy, Inc.,
400
 the Virginia Supreme Court explained that in a 
common law wrongful discharge action the trial judge erred in instructing 
the jury that the plaintiff must prove that their former employer’s illegal 
motive for terminating them was the sole cause of the termination decision. 
Instead, plaintiffs can prevail by demonstrating by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the termination occurred because of factors that violate 
Virginia’s public policy. 
In Adams, the Court of Appeals of D.C. held that “a discharged at-will 
employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when 
the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the 
law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.”401 The Wallace 
court affirmed the dismissal of an employee’s wrongful termination claim 
because she could not demonstrate that her employer terminated her 
“solely, or even substantially for engaging in conduct protected by such an 
exception.”402 Wallace’s allegations that other factors—such as 
professional envy of her extensive credentials by colleagues, refusal to 
cancel her daughter’s sixth birthday party, and reporting of five categories 
of alleged wrongdoing—contributed to her discharge prevented her from 
stating a viable claim for wrongful termination.
403
 In Carl, however, the 
court upheld a complaint alleging that the employer discharged the plaintiff 
for two discrete reasons—testifying before the D.C. Council against tort 
reform and serving as an expert witness for plaintiffs in medical 
malpractice cases.
404
 The court did so even though it deemed only the first 
of these reasons as sufficient to implicate a public policy exception.
405
 
Though the Wallace court noted this change in judicial precedent, it refused 
                                                          
399
 See Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Va. 1998).  
400
 No. 072556, Circuit Court No. CL-2006-0009565 (December 12, 2008). 
401
 Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); see also 
Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1998) (emphasis added).  
402
 Wallace, 715 A.2d at 886.  
403
 Id. at 885-86.  
404
  Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 165 (D.C. 1997). 
405
 Id. 
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to apply it to the case at bar.
406
 Neither Carl nor any other subsequent 
decision has specifically overturned the determination in Adams that the 
employer’s violation of public policy must be the sole reason from the 
employee’s termination. In fact, the Superior Court confirmed the “sole 
reason” standard recently in Byrd II.407 However, the plaintiff in Byrd II did 
not attempt to argue a different standard, so that point was conceded. 
Nevertheless, the decision in Carl inarguably interpreted Adams broadly 
and permitted additional public policy exceptions.
408
 There is no reason 
why plaintiff’s cannot argue that the Carl expansion of the common law 
claim also broadens the strict “sole reason” standard of causation to include 
the opportunity to please multiple, equally valid theories regarding the 
employer’s motivations. 
XI. DEFENSES 
 
The primary defenses employers have to confront wrongful termination 
claims are (1) available statutory remedies preempt the employee’s 
common law cause of action, and (2) the employer had a separate, 
legitimate reason to discharge the employee.  
 
A. Preemption by Other Statutory Remedies 
 
As the sections on workers’ compensation, discrimination, and 
occupational safety and health above mention, employees cannot assert a 
common law wrongful termination claim where there is a statutory civil 
remedy on point. The purpose of the public policy exception is to provide 
employees with a cause of action where an obvious wrong may stand 
unpunished. Courts in all three jurisdictions confirm preemption of a 
wrongful termination claim where a statutory action is available. The rule 
in Virginia, however, is more nuanced. 
Maryland courts named this preemption doctrine as the Makovi rule, 
referring to Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
409
 Makovi, in reviewing a case 
of pregnancy discrimination, held that the common law tort is “inherently 
limited to remedying only those discharges in violation of a clear mandate 
of public policy which otherwise would not be vindicated by a civil 
                                                          
406
 See Wallace, 715 A.2d at 890. 
407
 Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C, No. 2004-CA-004412-B, 2011 D.C. 
Super. Ct. LEXIS 8, 23 (Sept. 13, 2011). 
408
 See Bowie v. Gonzales, 433 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36 (D.D.C. 2006).  
409
 Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. Ct. App.1989).  
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remedy.”410 Title VII and Maryland’s FEPA, not Adler, was the plaintiff’s 
proper cause of action. Where a statute expresses the public policy 
foundation for an abusive discharge claim, and that statute already contains 
a remedy for vindicating the public policy objectives, then judicial 
recognition of an abusive discharge claim is both “redundant and 
inappropriate.”411  
Like any rule, the Makovi rule is not without its exceptions. In Makovi, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland admitted, “Sometimes the facts 
underlying a discharge constitute both a violation of an anti-discrimination 
statute and of another, more narrowly focused, statute reflecting clear 
public policy but providing no civil remedy.”412 For example, the court 
noted an Arkansas case where the plaintiff alleged her refusal to sleep with 
her supervisor was a refusal to engage in prostitution, which carried 
criminal, not civil, consequences.
413
 This was precisely the case in 
Insignia.
414
 As outlined previously, Ashton argued that Insignia wrongfully 
terminated her employment because she refused to acquiesce to a form of 
quid pro quo sexual harassment that would have amounted to an act of 
prostitution under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 11-301, et seq. The court 
explained that the Makovi rule does not apply when an employer violates a 
mandate of public policy independent from discrimination laws. Citing the 
decision of Watson, the Insignia court confirmed that there is no preclusion 
where an additional crime, such as assault and battery, arose out of 
workplace sexual harassment covered by statute.
415
 Keeping with the 
theme, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals refer to this exception to the 
Makovi rule as the Watson and Insignia exception.
416
  
The Virginia General Assembly went so far as to codify the preclusive 
nature of statutory remedies when employees seek common law tort claims. 
As mentioned previously, the Virginia General Assembly amended the 
VHRA in 1995 to preclude “causes of action based upon the public policies 
reflected in [the VHRA].”417 Virginia’s workers’ compensation statute 
includes a similar provision. Under section 65.2-307 of the Virginia 
Annotated Code, “The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee . 
                                                          
410
 Id. at 180.  
411
 Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 629 A.2d 1293, 1300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); 
see also King v. Marriott Inter. Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 904 (Md. Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 489 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)).  
412
 Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2D 179, 187 (Md. Ct. App. 1989).   
413
 Id. (citing Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir.1984)). 
414
 Insignia v. Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. App. 2000). 
415
 Id. at 1086 (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 769 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1991)). 
416
 See Magee v. DanSources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 256 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2001). 
417
 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2639(D) (2005).  
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. . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee.”418  
However, Virginia courts have not explicitly held that the existence of 
statutory remedies, as a general rule, precludes the availability of a 
Bowman claim. In fact, Virginia courts have implied that the common law 
public policy exception is separate and independent from statutory causes 
of action. For example: 
 
‘In order for the goal of the statute to be realized and the public 
policy fulfilled,’ the Supreme Court recognized an exception to 
the at-will doctrine.
419
 Later, in Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., the 
Supreme Court of Virginia noted that Bowman applied a narrow 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine but fell far short of 
recognizing a generalized cause of action for the tort of 
‘retaliatory discharge.’420 Indeed, the General Assembly of 
Virginia has enacted statutes providing a cause of action for 
‘retaliatory discharge’ under specific circumstances (such as 
discrimination against persons with disabilities;
421
 employees who 
file safety or health complaints,
422
  and employees who make 
workers’ compensation claims.423)424 
 
Statutes that derogate from the common law “must be strictly construed 
and not enlarged by construction beyond their express terms.”425 A 
statutory change in the common law “is limited to that which is expressly 
stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its language.”426 Thus, 
“[w]hen an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the 
common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its 
terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.”427 A plaintiff can 
theoretically argue that the existence of other statutory remedies, without 
                                                          
418
 VA. CODE ANN § 65.2-307(A) (1999). 
419
 Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985). 
420
 Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Va. 1987). 
421
 § 51.01-41; § 51.01-46. 
422
 § 40.1-51.2:1; 40.1-51.2:2. 
423
 § 65.1-40.1. 
424
 Shields v. P C-Expanders, Inc., NO. 119505, 1993 WL 946038 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 
15, 1993); see also Kerns v. Shirley Well Drilling, 11 Va. Cir. 15 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
425
 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. Sup. Ct. 
App.1965); see also Williams v. Matthews, 448 S.E.2d 625, 627-28, (Va. 1994); 
Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 1992). 
426
 Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250-51 (Va. 2000) (citing Boyd v. 
Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (Va. 1988); Strother v. Lynchburg Trust & 
Savings Bank, 156 S.E. 426, 428-29 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1931)).  
427
 Boyd, 374 S.E.2d at 302; see also Newport News v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 
514, 520 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1936).  
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explicit preclusion of common law claims, does not prevent her from 
bringing those common law causes of action. The same conduct or 
occurrence can support more than one theory of recovery.
428
 In sum, 
Virginia courts have not ruled, outside of the explicit common law 
derogations in the VHRA and workers’ compensation law, whether the 
existence of a statutory remedy preempts a wrongful termination claim 
under Bowman. 
Similar to the Insignia decision in Maryland, Virginia courts permit 
wrongful termination claims related to, but not specifically covered by, 
statutes like the VHRA. In Mitchem, the Virginia Supreme Court held that 
an employer’s termination of an employee for refusing to engage in a 
sexual relationship violated the Commonwealth’s public policies against 
fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior, embodied in Va. Code §§ 
18.2-344 and 345.
429
 
Under D.C. law, the Carl exception to the at-will employment doctrine 
does not apply when the very statute creating the public policy already 
contains a “specific and significant remedy” for the aggrieved party.430 In 
Nolting,
431
 the Court of Appeals of D.C. held that an employee cannot 
forego established administrative remedies and obtain recovery against an 
employer on the tort theory of wrongful termination.
432
 The court 
explained: 
 
[W]e are dealing here with a statutory provision which not only 
creates the wrong but also contains a specific remedy to 
compensate the person suffering that wrong. No such statute was 
involved in Adams; there was no administrative or other remedy 
available to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff in Adams 
would have gone uncompensated if the court had refused to 
recognize a public policy tort. In the case sub judice, appellant 
does not stand in that same position; she is not facing a situation 
in which the only possibility for compensation for her claimed 
injury is the recognition by this court of a public policy tort 
expansive enough to cover her situation.
433
  
 
The court has held that other statutes with proprietary causes of action, 
                                                          
428
 See Balzer and Assoc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (Va. 
1995); Fox v. Deese, 362 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 1987).  
429
 Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 249-50. 
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 Kakeh v. United Planning Organization, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(applying District of Columbia law).  
431
 Nolting v. Nat’l Capital Grp., Inc., 621 A.2d 1387 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
432
 Id. at 1389. 
433
 Id. (emphasis added); see also Freas v. Archer Serv., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002-03 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
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such as the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.51, et 
al., also preclude the creation of new public policy bases for wrongful 
termination claims.
434
 
 
B. Legitimate Business Reason 
 
As with most employee protections, employers are able to defend against 
a wrongful termination suit by asserting they had a legitimate business 
reason when discharging an employee. Maryland federal court provides the 
most poignant discussion on this topic. Reviewing a claim of retaliatory 
discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim, the U.S. District Court 
in Maryland held that “an employer who has mixed motives for discharging 
an employee may avoid liability, provided one motive is legitimate.”435  
This defense is not without limitation. An employer may not rely on two, 
or more, unlawful motives to subvert the prohibition against discharging an 
employee in violation of public policy. The federal court in Ford explained 
that and employer may not avoid liability for terminating an employee for 
mixed, but unlawful motives.
436
 The court rejected the employer’s 
challenge to overturn a verdict in favor of the employee because doing 
would absurdly “permit an employer to avoid liability in this unusual 
situation by terminating an employee solely for wrongful reasons.”437 
Therefore, an employer remains liable for wrongful discharge where the 
motives include unlawful reasons. 
 
XII. DAMAGES 
 
Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. courts agree that a prevailing plaintiff in a 
common law wrongful termination suit may recover economic, 
compensatory, and punitive damages. 
While the measure of damages in an action for wrongful discharge under 
Adler is the employee’s salary for the remainder of the period of 
employment, that is not the only remedy available.
438
 In Johnson v 
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 See Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1225-26 (D.C. 2009).  
435
 Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 647, 650 (D. Md. 1998) (interpreting 
Kern v. South Balt. Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. 1986) and citing Ayers v. ARA 
Health Care Serv., Inc., 918 F. Supp. 143, 149 (D. Md. 1995)).  
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 Ford, 999 F. Supp. at 649-651.  
437
 Id.  
438
 See Atholwood Dev. Co. v. Houston, 19 A.2d 706, 708 (Md. Ct. App. 1941).  
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Oroweat Foods Co.,
439
 the Fourth Circuit held that the terminated 
employee was entitled to recover expenses reasonably incurred in seeking 
alternative employment.
440
 In Adler, the court refused to dismiss the 
employee’s claim for punitive damages, thereby rejecting the employer’s 
argument that it would be unfair to award such damages in the same case 
where the underlying tort was for the first time recognized. As long as a 
plaintiff can support a finding of malice on behalf of the defendant, a court 
will permit the recovery of punitive damages.
441
 An employee must still 
undertake to mitigate the damages by at least attempting, in good faith, to 
secured subsequent employment.
442
 
Under Bowman, a successful plaintiff is entitled to economic, 
compensatory, and punitive damages.
443
 The court in Shaw outlined: 
 
As we stated in Bowman, the common law cause of action for 
wrongful termination of employment sounds in tort. Titan 
conceded in the district court that this cause of action is an 
intentional tort. When a plaintiff pleads and proves an intentional 
tort under the common law of Virginia, the trier of fact may award 
punitive damages. Thus, we conclude that, under Virginia law, 
Shaw was entitled to recover punitive damages in the present 
action, and we answer the second certified question in the 
affirmative.
444
 
 
As in Maryland, punitive (or exemplary) damages are allowable only 
where there is malice on the part of the defendant.
445
 Where the aggrieved 
injury is “free from fraud, malice, oppression, or other special aggravation, 
compensatory damages only are allowed.”446  
Similarly, D.C. courts may award lost pay, compensatory damages, and 
punitive damages to a prevailing employee under a claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.
447
 To receive punitive damages, a 
plaintiff must prove the defendant’s malicious intent by clear and 
                                                          
439
 Johnson v Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1986). 
440
 Id. at 509. 
441
 See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1151 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1990).  
442
 See Atholwood, 179 Md. at 708. 
443
 See Wynne v. Birach, No. 1:09cv15, 2009 WL 36, at *72119 (E.D. Va. 2009)) 
(citing Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696 (Va. 1998)).  
444
 Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 701(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
445
 Burruss v. Hines, 26 S.E. 875 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1897) (citing Norfolk & W.R. 
Co. v. Neely, 22 S.E. 367 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1895)). 
446
Id. at 877. 
447
 See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); see also 
Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C, No. 2004-CA-004412-B, 2011 D.C. Super. 
Ct. LEXIS 8, 38 (Sept. 13, 2011).  
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convincing evidence: 
 
To sustain an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed 
a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act 
was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice 
or its equivalent.
448
 
XIII. PRACTICAL ADVICE AND CONCLUSION 
 
A. Review Civil and Criminal Statutes 
 
Many state and local legislatures have passed civil statutes protecting 
employees from unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and termination. 
Given the general rule that civil statutes with their own causes of action 
preempt common law wrongful termination claims, it is essential to review 
state and federal statutes before bringing a tort claim. One of the best ways 
to avoid a preclusion issue is to find a criminal statute on point, such as 
criminal prohibitions on prostitution and lewd behavior.
449
 Rarely do 
criminal statutes include civil causes of action, and rarely will a court find 
that a criminal statute does not espouse a public policy of the state. 
 
B. Framing the Cause of Action 
 
Frame the cause of action as “refusal to participate in unlawful activity” 
instead of “reporting unlawful activity.” Many cases in Maryland, Virginia, 
and D.C. clarify the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine is not a 
general protections for “whistleblowers.”450 
 
C. Forum Selection 
 
Employees generally obtain higher verdicts in state court and are more 
likely to survive summary judgment in state court. In addition, federal 
                                                          
448
 Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682 (D.C. 2003). 
449
 See, e.g., Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. App. 
2000); Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246 (Va. 2000). 
450
 See e.g., Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., No. 93-7587, 1993 WL 762109 (D.C. Super. 
Sept. 14, 1993) aff’d, 657 A.2d 770 (D.C. 1995); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 
482 (Md. Ct. App. 2002). 
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courts, including the Fourth Circuit, often construe wrongful termination 
claims more narrowly than state courts. Accordingly, state court is the 
preferred forum for litigating an Adler, Bowman, or Carl claim. 
 
D. Discovery 
  
In discovery, plaintiff should focus on developing evidence on the 
following issues: 
1. Direct evidence of retaliatory motive, such as an admission that the 
decision-maker was angry at the employee for engaging in protected 
conduct. 
2. Close temporal proximity between the employee’s protected conduct 
and the decision to terminate the employee. 
3. Deviation from company policy or practice, such as singling out the 
employee for extraordinary disciplinary action. For example, if the 
employer disciplined the employee for sending an innocuous email to his 
spouse letting her know that he is working late, and the company has not 
disciplined other employees for sending inappropriate emails, the 
disciplinary action taken against the employee will provide evidence of 
disparate treatment. 
4. Comparator evidence demonstrating disparate treatment. 
5. Animus for the employee’s protected conduct. For example, the high 
cost to the employer of complying with the law or regulation implicated by 
the employee suggests employer animus. Conversely, develop evidence on 
the revenue that the employer generated or expected to generate by 
engaging in a fraudulent scheme about which the employee complained. 
6. Falsity of the employer’s alleged business justification for the 
discharge, showing pretext. 
7. Evidence of unusual efforts by a senior manager or officer to retaliate 
against the employee. For example, if a senior officer who is not 
responsible for evaluating the employee’s performance and who typically 
does not evaluate the performance of such employees, it would be very 
suspicious if the senior officer spends time papering the personnel file of 
the employee to create a justification for terminating the employee. It is 
also the type of conduct that may demonstrate malice. 
 
E. Maximizing Damages 
  
The employer’s animus toward the employee’s protected activity is a 
strong indication of malice. Similarly, evidence that the employer deviated 
from policies or protocols in terminating the employee can help prove 
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malice. 
To obtain substantial punitive damages, it is critical to focus on what it 
would cost to deter the employer from violating the public policy. For 
example, requiring an employer to merely pay a discharged employee lost 
wages will not deter an employer who terminates an employee for reporting 
the discharge of toxic waste into public waterways. Instead, requiring the 
employer to pay the cost of cleaning up the pollution it caused is a greater 
deterrent. 
The plaintiff’s evidence of damages should be as detailed as the evidence 
of the employer’s liability. For example, a plaintiff should proffer detailed 
evidence of the basis for calculating lost wages and benefits, and should 
offer detailed testimony from friends and family of the plaintiff describing 
how the wrongful discharge affected the plaintiff. 
 
F. Employee Attributes that Strengthen a Wrongful Discharge Claim 
 
Before choosing to represent the terminated employee, know the 
attributes that defense counsel fear most:  
1. A long-term employee (more than nine years) with a satisfactory or 
better performance record and at least some prior expertise in the public 
policy basis of her complaint. 
2. An employee who discloses wrongdoing in a timely manner using the 
employer’s established complaint protocol in a non-contumacious manner.  
3. An employee who is not complicit in her employer’s wrongdoing.  
4. An employee who objects about a matter of public concern (e.g., a 
matter relating to public health or safety). 
5. An employee who cooperates fully in her employer’s investigation of 
her disclosure. 
7. An employee who the employer terminates within six (6) months of 
her protected disclosure, exercise of a statutory right, or refusal to engage 
in an illegal act.  
 
G. Selecting a Theme 
 
Before trying the case, be prepared to answer the core question in the 
minds of jurors: why does the plaintiff deserve relief? Keep the focus on 
the employer’s conduct and make the jury understand why your client 
found it necessary to object to the employer’s behavior. Emphasize the 
public interest aspect of the case. For example, if your client refused to 
follow orders to sell contaminated food, focus on the employer’s callous 
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disregard for public safety. The employer’s motive for terminating plaintiff 
is not just a core legal element; it is also a core focus of the plaintiff’s trial 
presentation. 
In selecting and developing your theme, the following guidelines set 
forth in Charles L. Belcon’s Alta’s Litigating Tort Cases § 12:10 (2008) are 
useful:  
1. Does the theme summarize the “story”? 
2. Does it have factual as well as emotional appeal?  
3. Does it paint a visual image for the jury? 
4. Does it blend with the life experiences, values, and perceptions of 
jurors?  
5. Does it apply classical rhetorical principles of ethos, pathos, and 
logos? 
6. Does it guide the jurors’ decision-making process?  
7. Is it consistent with the applicable legal instructions? 
8. Does it point out the injustice in the case and allow the jurors to view 
a victory for the client as somehow advancing community interests?  
9. Does the theme have universal application?
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XIV. CONCLUSION 
 
Adler, Bowman, and Carl claims provide a fertile ground for discharged 
employees to hold employers accountable for terminations that violate a 
clear mandate of public policy, including the opportunity to recover 
substantial punitive damages. This amorphous, yet potent, tort provides a 
powerful tool to employees that should enable plaintiffs to continue to 
obtain high verdicts against employers who violate a clear mandate of 
public policy in terminating employees. 
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